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JOHN A. BINGHAM AND THE STORY OF AMERICAN 
LIBERTY: THE LOST CAUSE MEETS THE “LOST 
CLAUSE” 
Michael Kent Curtis* 
I.  INTRODUCTION: OUR STORY 
We tell and retell stories.  Individuals have stories and so do 
families. The stories tell us who we are and how we fit in the widening 
concentric circles of the individual, the family, the community, the 
nation and the world.1 
Nations have stories too.  Ours is a story about the American 
Revolution against monarchy and aristocracy, a revolution based on the 
faith that all people are created equal and endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable rights.  The revolution espoused the ideal that 
legitimate governmental power comes only from the consent of the 
governed. 
In the old world, kings were sovereign.  In America, the sovereign 
was “the people.” That ideal appeared in the preamble of the 
Constitution—a preamble that declared (somewhat inaccurately) that the 
Constitution came from “we the people” and was designed to assure 
liberty and justice.  Though we often fall short of them, ideals matter.  
The Bill of Rights to the Constitution, added in 1791, also stated ideals; 
 
* Michael Kent Curtis, BA University of the South; MA University of Chicago; JD University of 
North Carolina.  Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law.  © Michael Kent Curtis.  
Thanks to Ronald Wright, Malcolm B. Futhey, III, Sandy Levinson, Dan Farber, Miles Foy, 
William Ross, and Michael Perry for very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.  I owe 
special thanks to Malcolm Futhey for reading many drafts of this article and providing his 
remarkably insightful suggestions.  I also want to thank research assistants Matthew Thomas, 
Charles Alexander Castle, and Malcolm Futhey for their very fine help with research.  The mistakes 
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at 15. 
 1. JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING (1990); SAM KEEN, TO A DANCING GOD 83-105 
(1970). 
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it declared and protected basic liberties of the people.  With the end of 
the Civil War, slavery was abolished.  In 1919 women got the vote.  At 
any rate, according to our story, the United States is a democracy that 
protects basic rights of its citizens. 
As far as I can recall, that was pretty much the American story I 
learned in public schools in Galveston, Texas, in the 1950s.  Of course, 
the dominant Texas story had some peculiarities that did not fit too well 
with the larger story.  According to the version I recall, greedy Yankees 
and ignorant blacks subjected the South to a period of misrule after the 
Civil War—from which, somehow or other, the South was rescued. If 
my high school history book told me just how the rescue was effected, I 
do not recall. 
The Texas story was supplemented by others I heard.  The Civil 
War, my grandmother assured me, was not about slavery.  It was about 
states’ rights. 
But there was a troubling dissonance between the old story and the 
world of the 1950s and 1960s.  Blacks were seeking integrated 
education, the right to vote, and the right to equal treatment in 
employment and in places of public accommodation.  By the eighth 
grade, I was a strong supporter of the decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education.  But, of course, critics of the decision said it violated states’ 
rights. 
Around this time, my older cousin Walter (a Yankee from New 
York) came to visit.  I remember my grandmother telling him, “You 
know Walter, the South won the first and last battles of the Civil War.”  
Walter replied, “Yes grandmother, but the North won the war.” 
My grandmother had left out a crucial Southern victory.  Though I 
did not know it at the time, Civil War and Reconstruction history had 
long been a battleground.  The Southern elite lost the Civil War, but for 
many years it won the battle for American history. 
The post Civil War battle over history was not simply about the 
past—it never is.  If the Southern slaveholding elite had led the South 
into a ruinous war to defend their financial stake in a discredited 
institution, recognition of that fact would have helped to fuel first the 
Southern Republican and then the Populist revolt against the old order. 
For the ante-bellum Southern elite, the decision to rewrite history made 
practical sense. The Commissar in George Orwell’s book 1984 put the 
issue succinctly: “Who controls the past controls the present.  Who 
controls the present, controls the future.” 
Supporters of the old Southern elite launched a massive propaganda 
2
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campaign.2  They purged schools and public libraries of offending 
books, and they monitored teachers too.  They attempted to purify 
colleges and universities.  They gave public speeches and organized 
youth groups where children were taught catechisms about states rights 
and happy slaves.3  The revisers had substantial success in the South and 
to a remarkable degree in the North as well. 
The Southern revisionist history of the Civil War—that it was about 
states’ rights, not slavery—was grossly distorted.  In the years before the 
Civil War, congressmen argued again and again about slavery.  States’ 
rights had merely a supporting role, appearing on the stage when useful, 
disappearing when inconvenient.  When states’ rights suited the needs of 
slaveholders, they argued states’ rights.  When states’ rights interfered 
with the slaveholder agenda, appeals to states’ rights were abandoned.4  
So states’ rights disappeared from the stage when Northern state laws 
provided due process protections for blacks living in the North who were 
claimed as fugitive slaves.  Similarly, Southern politicians ignored 
Northern states’ free speech rights in their demands that Northern states 
suppress abolitionists and extradite abolitionist editors for trial in the 
South or change their state laws and constitutions to suppress 
abolitionist “agitation.”  On these occasions, Northerners were more 
likely to invoke states’ rights. 
The most telling evidence that slavery–not states’ rights–was the 
cause of the Civil War comes from speeches by Southern leaders 
advocating or justifying secession. Jefferson Davis, who became the 
Confederate President, said excluding slavery from the territories would 
make “property in slaves so insecure as to be comparatively worthless” 
and in effect would “annihilate property worth thousands of millions of 
dollars.”5  In March 1861, Alexander Stephens, Vice President of the 
Confederacy, said the nation had been founded on the false idea that all 
men were created equal.  The Confederacy, he said, was “founded upon 
exactly the opposite idea.”  The foundation of the Confederacy was the 
“great truth that the negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery. . . 
 
 2. Fred Arthur Bailey, Free Speech and the Lost Cause in the Old Dominion, 103 VA. MAG. 
OF HIST. AND BIOGRAPHY 237-924 (April 1995). 
 3. Id. at 244-58. 
 4. For a discussion of the use of states’ rights by both Northern and Southern states (when 
convenient), see Paul Finkelman, States Rights, North and South in AN UNCERTAIN TRADITION 
(Kermit Hall and J. Ely eds., 1989). 
 5. 5 JEFFERSON DAVIS, CONSTITUTIONALIST: HIS LETTERS, PAPERS AND SPEECHES 72 
(Dunbar Roland ed., Miss. Dept. of Archives and History, 1923).  James McPherson, Southern 
Comfort, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, April 12, 2001 at 28. 
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is his natural and moral condition.”6  The commissioners sent from the 
first seceding states to encourage other Southern states to join them 
justified secession based on the threat to slave property.7  Of seventeen 
reasons Mississippi gave for leaving the Union in its January 9, 1861, 
“Declaration of Causes of Secession,” at least sixteen related to slavery.8  
The final one warned of the loss of property worth “four billions of 
money.”  After the Civil War, Jefferson Davis, Alexander Stephens and 
others sang a different tune: the war was about states’ rights, not slavery. 
Of course, the stories we tell are important.  Often, however, the 
most significant stories are the ones we repress, ignore, or forget–the 
elephant in the living room no one talks about.  For many years, the 
nation ignored how slavery and the Southern racial caste system had 
undermined the nation’s ideals of equality, liberty, and democracy. We 
have celebrated the Framers of the original Constitution and of the Bill 
of Rights.  But for years our national story largely ignored our second 
group of framers who gave the nation the new birth of freedom in the 
post Civil War amendments.  Most of us have never heard of the old 
time Republicans who framed the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments, people like John A. Bingham of Ohio, Jacob Howard of 
Michigan, and James Wilson of Iowa.  They struggled to put liberty and 
equality on a more secure constitutional foundation.  But for many years, 
they and their efforts were generally ignored, and when not ignored they 
were often attacked. 
To the extent that it told the story of Reconstruction at all, the 
dominant view until the 1950s tended to be critical of the Republicans in 
Congress from 1866-1873 and critical of the Republican Southern state 
governments established during Reconstruction.9  These views were 
expressed, for example, in studies coming out of Columbia University in 
New York City.  In 1914, Professor J. G. de Roulhac Hamilton 
contended that Reconstruction in North Carolina was an episode when 
“selfish politicians, backed by the federal government, for party 
purposes attempted to Africanize the State and deprive the people 
through misrule and oppression of most that life held dear.”10 
 
 6. Speech of Alexander Stephens, AUGUSTA DAILY CONSTITUTIONALIST, Mar. 30, 1861, 
cited in McPherson, supra note 5 . 
 7. CHARLES B. DEW, APOSTLES OF DISUNION: SOUTHERN SECESSION COMMISSIONERS AND 
THE CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR (2001). 
 8. Mississippi Declaration of Causes of Secession, Jan. 9, 1861. 
 9. See, e.g., RICHARD N. CURRENT, ARGUING WITH HISTORIANS 78-79 (1987); DAVID W. 
BRIGHT, RACE AND REUNION: THE CIVIL WAR IN AMERICAN MEMORY 395 (2001). 
 10. J. G. DE ROULHAC HAMILTON, RECONSTRUCTION IN NORTH CAROLINA (Vol. LVIII of 
Studies in History, Economics and Public Law edited by the faculty of Political Science of 
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In Louisiana, as elsewhere in the South, the end of Reconstruction 
and the triumph of the “Redeemers” was facilitated by violence and 
intimidation aimed at blacks and Republicans.  In his 1939 biography, 
Mr. Justice Miller and the Supreme Court (1862-1890), published by the 
Harvard University Press, Charles Fairman referred to the Republican 
government supported by blacks and whites as the “carpetbag 
government.”  According to Fairman, when that government was 
removed, “self government was restored in Louisiana.”11 
Of course, some told a very different story about Reconstruction.12  
By the 1960s, during the Second Reconstruction, historians generally 
began to look again at the First, and to reconsider the conventional 
wisdom.13 
Still, the Southern story had a pervasive effect and reconsideration 
of it was slow to penetrate the world of legal scholars or the marble 
palace of the law.14  For many years, Charles Fairman’s discussion of 
whether the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to require states to 
obey the Bill of Rights was treated by most scholars as historically, if 
not legally, definitive.15 Fairman was quite critical of John Bingham—
the principle author of Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment and of 
other Republicans in the Thirty-ninth Congress.16  The major scholarly 
criticism of Fairman’s article17 was ignored.  Fairman devoted no 
significant attention to the more than thirty years of attempts to suppress 
anti-slavery speech that preceded the framing of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 
Columbia University) (1964 reprint of 1914 edition). 
 11. CHARLES FAIRMAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT (1862-1890) 180 
(1939). 
 12. See, e.g., W. E. B. DuBois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION (1935); VERNON L. WHARTON, 
THE NEGRO IN MISSISSIPPI (1947, 1965).  For an overview of historians treatment of constitutional 
issues connected with the Civil War and Reconstruction, see Michael Les Benedict, A 
Constitutional Crisis in WRITING THE CIVIL WAR: THE QUEST TO UNDERSTAND 154-73 (James M. 
McPherson and William J. Cooper, Jr. eds. 1998). 
 13. E.g., KENNETH STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-1877 (1965).  The most 
comprehensive recent study is ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED 
REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (1998). 
 14. For a thoughtful discussion, see PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING 
RECONSTRUCTION 11-13, 115-116 (1999). 
 15. See MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 2-3 (1986) [hereinafter CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE].  See also, 
e.g., NOEL T. DOWLING & GERALD GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
730 (1965) (omitting Crosskey’s response to Fairman). 
 16. Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights, 2 STAN. 
L. REV. 5 (1949). 
 17. William Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman, “Legislative History,” and the 
Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954). 
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In 1964, the Supreme Court wrote its great decision in New York 
Times v. Sullivan,18 protecting the right to criticize Southern 
segregationist officials.  But when the Court looked for a paradigmatic 
historical event to support its decision, it cited only to the repudiation of 
the Sedition Act.19  It did not cite the suppression of anti-slavery and 
Republican speech in the South before the Civil War or the connection 
between these events and Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment.20  
Of course, the libel suit against the New York Times was based on state 
law, not federal law.  The Fourteenth Amendment was the precise source 
of the free press protection at issue in the New York Times case.  The 
advertisement supporting Martin Luther King that produced the suit was 
part of the continuing struggle against the legacy of slavery.  Why did 
the Court fail to cite such pertinent history?  There may be several 
reasons, but certainly one is crucial.  The battle for free speech and other 
civil liberties for opponents of slavery and Republicans had been largely 
forgotten.  Of course, the effect of that struggle on shaping the 
Fourteenth Amendment was also forgotten. 
The majority opinion in the 1873 Slaughter-House Cases ignored 
the struggle for civil liberty for opponents of slavery.  Instead, the Court 
pictured the Fourteenth Amendment as merely a response to Black 
Codes passed by the Southern states after the Civil War.  As the Court 
reported them, those acts simply denied blacks the right to contract, to 
own property, etc.21  The Slaughter-House Court gave examples of the 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States that the 
Fourteenth Amendment protected against the states.  Typically, these 
had little to do with the struggle to protect civil liberties for critics of 
slavery or with the problems facing black and white Republicans during 
Reconstruction.  According to the Court, the clause meant that citizens 
had the right to go to and return from the seat of government, to visit the 
sub-treasuries, and to be protected on the high seas and in foreign lands.  
The Court also mentioned the rights to assemble and petition, rights it 
soon limited to assembling to petition the national government.22  The 
 
 18. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 19. Id. at 273.  See also Brief of the New York Times, 58 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND 
ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 41-51 (original) 444-54 (Philip B 
Kurland; Gerhard Casper, eds. 1975).  See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION 
AND RECONSTRUCTION 243, 307 (1998); MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, “THE PEOPLE’S 
DARLING PRIVILEGE:” STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY  299, 412 
(2000) [hereinafter, CURTIS, FREE SPEECH]. 
 20. See CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 19, at chapters 5-13 and 16. 
 21. Slaughter-house Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 70 (1872). 
 22. 83 U.S. at 78-80.  Recently some scholars have suggested that the majority opinion in 
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Court’s story of the Fourteenth Amendment—a story that leaves out the 
struggle for civil liberty in the years before the Civil War—was 
reiterated by prominent legal scholars.23 
The lingering effects of our national amnesia and of the Southern 
elite’s story of Reconstruction can be seen in 1977.  In that year, the 
Harvard University Press published Raoul Berger’s book Government by 
Judiciary, which received wide public attention. 
The Supreme Court in the period from 1872-1900 had interpreted 
the Constitution so as to undermine the first Reconstruction. The Warren 
Court, however, interpreted the Constitution to support the Second 
Reconstruction.  Raoul Berger was harshly critical of many of its 
decisions, including those of the Warren Court and its predecessors 
applying guarantees in the Bill of Rights to the states, “the incorporation 
doctrine.”  The name seems to come from the idea that liberties referred 
to in the Bill of Rights are incorporated by reference by general 
descriptions of constitutional rights in Section one of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
Whether the rights in the Bill of Rights were merely limits on the 
federal government (as the old Court had typically held from 1876-
1924), or were rights of American citizens that the states must also obey, 
was an issue in both Reconstructions.  Unlike the old Court, beginning 
in the 1930s and reaching a high point during the Warren Court, the 
Court held most guarantees of the Bill of Rights were incorporated in the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Without application of free speech, press, 
petition, and assembly guarantees to the states, the Southern states could 
have done more to suppress the Civil Rights Movement’s dissent against 
their racial caste system. 
Raoul Berger attacked these incorporation decisions as unrelated to 
the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, and he insisted 
original intent was the test for how the Constitution should be construed.  
Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan was a problem for Mr. Berger, 
because Howard introduced the Fourteenth Amendment to the Senate on 
behalf of the Joint Committee that drafted it.  Senator Howard clearly 
said that the Amendment’s “privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States” included the guarantees of the Bill of Rights; the 
Fourteenth Amendment clearly said that “no state shall . . . abridge” 
these privileges or immunities.  So Berger sought to discredit Howard as 
 
Slaughter-house is consistent with requiring states to obey most guarantees of the Bill of Rights. 
 23. E.g., Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights, 2 
STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).  For a critical review of approaches to Reconstruction history, see 
generally, PAMELA BRANDWEIN, RECONSTRUCTING RECONSTRUCTION (1999). 
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unrepresentative.  To do so, he cited Benjamin Kendrick, one of the 
historians who followed the Southern elite’s approach to Reconstruction 
history.  Mr. Berger wrote, “Howard, according to Kendrick, was ‘one of 
the most . . . reckless of the radicals,’ who had ‘served consistently in the 
vanguard of the extreme Negrophiles.’”24 Similarly, Mr. Berger 
launched verbal attacks against John A. Bingham of Ohio—the primary 
author of Section one and the subject of this symposium.  Berger’s 
attacks were designed to show that statements by Bingham supporting 
the intent to apply the Bill of Rights to the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment were also unreliable.  Bingham, he said, was “muddled,” 
“inept,”25 veered “as crazily as a rudderless ship” and was “unable to 
understand what he read.”26  Finally, Berger asserted that there was “no 
inkling” that the North had become dissatisfied with the protections the 
states afforded to Bill of Rights liberties from 1789 to 1866.27 
As a matter of historical fact, this last assertion is simply, utterly, 
grossly, and demonstrably wrong.  But Mr. Berger’s pronouncement is a 
powerful witness for another proposition.  Its publication in a 1977  
book from the Harvard University Press brilliantly illuminates the 
lingering effects of the successful repression of the story of the clash 
between slavery on one side and liberty and democracy on the other.  
Berger’s book shows how most Americans had long forgotten a crucial 
part of their history—that slavery (and the caste system that replaced it) 
threatened Bill of Rights liberties such as free speech, free press, free 
exercise of religion, freedom from unreasonable searches, and freedom 
from cruel and unusual punishments.  Many had also forgotten that 
Southern states targeted speech and press on behalf of Lincoln’s 
Republican party for suppression.28  In sum, Government by Judiciary 
shows how utterly many had also forgotten that slavery and the caste 
system that was its legacy threatened the most basic requirements for 
democratic government. 
Of course, the Republicans who framed the post Civil War 
 
 24. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 147 (1977) (hereinafter GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY). 
 25. Id. at 145, 219. 
 26. Raoul Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine 
Lived Cat, 42 OHIO ST. L. J. 435, 460 (1982). 
 27. GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY, supra note 24, at 182. 
 28. CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 19, at Chapters 12 and 13.  See also, e.g., CLEMENT 
EATON, THE FREEDOM OF THOUGHT STRUGGLE IN THE OLD SOUTH (revised ed. 1964) (focusing on 
events in the Southern states) ; RUSSELL B. NYE, FETTERED FREEDOM: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE 
SLAVERY CONTROVERSY 1830-1860 (1949); W. SHERMAN SAVAGE, THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF ABOLITION LITERATURE 1830-1860 (1968). 
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 36 [2003], Iss. 4, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol36/iss4/2
NEWCURTIS.DOC 7/28/03  11:48 AM 
2003] THE STORY OF AMERICAN LIBERTY 625 
amendments had not forgotten the suppressions of civil liberty in the 
interest of slavery that rocked the nation from 1835-1860.  There are 
many actors in this long forgotten story.  One of the most important is 
John A. Bingham, congressman from Ohio. 
So I will discuss John A. Bingham’s understanding liberty under 
the Constitution.  Bingham was a Nineteenth Century human being.  
Like others from the Nineteenth Century, not all of his ideas met 
Twenty-first Century standards.  There are respects in which he has 
“failed to keep up with the times as a result of being dead.”29  
Bingham was not perfect.  But, of course, neither were other 
founders who have been enshrined in the pantheon of constitutional 
heroes.  Far more than most, Bingham made substantial and enduring 
contributions to constitutional liberty.  Bingham has important things to 
teach us.  Had we been able to follow more consistently where Bingham 
was trying to lead, we might have had a freer and more democratic 
nation in the years after the Civil War. 
The tide of public attention is turning.30  A growing group of 
 
 29. The phrase comes from Russell Baker. 
 30. A number of legal studies have focused on the historical background of the fourteenth 
amendment with regard to guarantees of civil liberty.  Typically these have built on prior work and 
offered new evidence and interpretation as well.  For an early scholarly study, see HORACE E. 
FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908, 1965).  For two pioneering 
studies of anti-slavery influence, see HOWARD J. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN’S CONSTITUTION (1968) 
and JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (enlarged ed., 1965).  Both examined anti-slavery 
origins of the fourteenth amendment.  Crosskey built on their insights and added powerful 
additional research and analysis in William Winslow Crosskey, Charles Fairman, “Legislative 
History,” and the Constitutional Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954).  
Analysis of the issue was further advanced in Alfred Avins, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: The 
Crosskey-Fairman Debates Revisited, 6 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1968) and Robert J. Kaczorowski, 
Searching for the Intent of the Framers of Fourteenth Amendment, 5 CONN. L. REV. 368 (1972-73).  
RICHARD H. SEWELL, BALLOTS FOR FREEDOM: ANTISLAVERY POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 
1837-1860 (1976) provides an excellent survey of the rise of the political anti-slavery movement.  
For a very important study of early anti-slavery legal thought, see WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE 
SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848 (1977). 
My own work was heavily influenced by Crosskey and my understanding of the subject 
evolved over time.  See Michael Kent Curtis, The Bill of Rights as a Limitation on State Authority: 
A Reply to Professor Berger, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 45 (1980); Michael Kent Curtis, The 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 14 CONN. L. REV. 237 (1982); Michael Kent Curtis, 
Further Adventures of the Nine Lived Cat: A Response to Mr. Berger on Incorporation of the Bill of 
Rights, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 89 (1982).  For a critique of Mr. Berger’s work, see Aviam Soifer, 
Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique of Raoul Berger’s History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651 (1979).  For 
an overview of this period of American Legal History and significant additional analysis of the 
meaning of the first section of the fourteenth amendment, see HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. 
WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1835-1875, at 386-438 
(1982).  See also Daniel A. Farber & John E. Muench, The Ideological Origins of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 1 CONST. COMMENTARY 235 (1984).  A broad history and critical analysis of the 
incorporation issue appears in NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 15.  A very important and 
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scholars is focusing on Bingham.  In March of 2000, the Library of 
Congress held a symposium on John Bingham that was broadcast on C-
Span.  In 2002, the University of Akron School of Law devoted this 
symposium and an issue of its law review to John Bingham.  Soon, 
perhaps John A. Bingham will return to the great story of American 
liberty after long years of exile.  Perhaps in 2006, there will be a John A. 
Bingham postage stamp commemorating the framing of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, or a posthumous congressional medal, or some other token 
of recognition. 
There are many places one might start the story of John A. 
Bingham and constitutional liberty.  I will start with two speeches 
Bingham made in the House of Representatives in 1856.  Both grew out 
of the controversy in Kansas. 
II.  JOHN BINGHAM AND THE FIREEATERS 
In 1854, Congress repealed the Missouri Compromise banning 
slavery north of thirty-six degrees, thirty minutes. Under the Kansas 
Nebraska Act, each territory was to decide for itself whether to accept or 
reject slavery.  Kansas erupted into civil war between pro and anti-
slavery factions.  The repeal of the Missouri Compromise had created a 
 
insightful article by Akhil Amar added still more evidence and fresh interpretation. See Akhil Reed 
Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193 (1992) and was 
followed by his luminous book, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998).  
An important article by Richard Aynes is a powerful answer to the ad hominem attacks on Bingham 
which, unhappily, have been too prominent in discussion of the incorporation issue.  See Richard 
Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57 (1993).  
See also, Richard Aynes, Charles Fairman, Felix Frankfurter, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1197 (1995). For important scholarship denying application of the Bill of Rights 
to the States under the fourteenth amendment, see RAOUL BERGER, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1989) and WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM 
POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988).  Scholars who have concluded that 
incorporation was intended have included writers of all political persuasions.  In addition to 
Professor Avins, the most recent “conservative” to support incorporation is EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL 
RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869 (1990).  Most students of the subject who 
have studied it in detail have concluded that some form of application to the states of all 
constitutional guarantees of personal liberty was probably intended by the framers of the fourteenth 
amendment.  These include Flack, Crosskey, Avins, Curtis, Hyman and Wiecek, Kaczorowski, 
Maltz, Amar, and Aynes.  Berger and Nelson deny any incorporation.  Fairman, TenBroek, 
Guminski, and Graham opt for some form of selective incorporation.  Charles Fairman, Does the 
Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?: The Original Understanding, 2 STAN L. 
REV. 5 (1949); Arnold T. Guminski, The Rights, Privileges, and Immunities of the American 
People: A Disjunctive Theory of Selective Incorporation of the Bill of Rights, 7 WHITTIER L. REV. 
765 (1985).  For a lively popular history of the fourteenth amendment, see HOWARD N. MEYER, 
THE AMENDMENT THAT REFUSED TO DIE (rev. ed. 1978).  There are many important more recent 
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new political party, the Republican party, almost overnight.  Kansas was 
a central issue for Republicans, whose party had been formed to oppose 
extension of slavery into the territories.  Debate over Kansas dominated 
the Congress. 
In 1856, the Congress debated the admission of Kansas to statehood 
under a pro-slavery government installed by the John Tyler 
administration.  Kansas had two “elected” state governments—a pro-
slavery one supported by the Administration and a free state one elected 
by a majority of the voters of the state.  Democrats favored admitting 
Kansas to the Union under its slave state Constitution.  Republicans 
wanted  to admit Kansas as a free state, under a free state constitution. 
Charles Sumner, the abolitionist Senator from Massachusetts, made 
a speech on the “Crime Against Kansas.”  In his oration, Sumner 
referred to a speech by South Carolina’s Senator Andrew P. Butler’s in 
favor of the slave state government.  Sumner described Butler as a “Don 
Quixote” who had chosen “the harlot, Slavery” as “his mistress to whom 
he has made his vows.”31 Sumner’s speech caused an uproar.  Even 
some Republicans had reservations about his rhetoric. 
Two days after Sumner’s speech and shortly after the Senate ended 
its session for the day, Congressman Preston Brooks, a cousin of 
Andrew Butler, came to the floor of the Senate.  Brooks beat Sumner 
(his legs trapped under his bolted down Senate desk) over the head thirty 
times with a gold topped cane.  Finally, Sumner wrenched the desk free 
from the floor and then collapsed, his head covered with blood. 
Southerners cheered Brooks.  In his congressional speech against 
the attack on Sumner, a disgusted Bingham quoted the Richmond 
Enquirer of June 2, 1856, which said:  
[i]n the main the press of the South applauded the conduct of Mr. 
Brooks without condition or limitation.  Our approbation is . . .  entire 
and unreserved. . . .  [The act was] good in conception, better in 
execution, and best of all in consequence.  These vulgar Abolitionists 
in the Senate are getting above themselves. . . . They have grown 
saucy. . . .  They must be lashed into submission.32 
Bingham saw the attack on Sumner as an attack on constitutional 
liberty.  The Constitution provided in Article I, Section six that “for any 
speech or Debate in either House, [senators or representatives] shall not 
be questioned in any other place.”  Bingham rejected the claim that the 
 
 31. JAMES MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 150 (1988). 
 32. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong. 1st Sess. 1580 (1856).  [Hereinafter citations to the 
Congressional Globe will be in the form: GLOBE, supra note 32, 34(1) 1580 (1856)]. 
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privilege applied only during an actual session of the Senate and that in 
any case it did not reach Brooks’ assault.  For him, “The freedom of 
speech and the security of person are upon trial to-day.  These great 
rights underlie and are essential to all representative government.  
[W]ithout their observance there can be no free Constitution and no free 
people.”33 
The attack on Sumner was an assault on “the great privilege of the 
people, . . . the freedom of speech and debate in their legislative 
assembles, and the absolute immunity of their representatives from 
outrage, or insult, or menace in their exercise thereof.”34 
In addition, all the people, including Senators and Representatives, 
had a right “to be secure in their persons” under the Fourth 
Amendment.35  For Bingham, Brooks was guilty not only of assault and 
battery, but also an act of contempt against the Congress. 
While a majority report from a House committee favored 
disciplining Brooks, the minority report held that the constitutional 
power to punish a member for disorderly behavior was limited to 
behavior that disrupted an actual session of the House or Senate.  
Furthermore, Brooks’ defenders said the speech and debate protection 
was limited to “proper and legitimate” speeches, and Sumner’s speech 
was neither.  As Bingham saw it, the minority was reading the 
Constitutional protection as follows: 
Each House may punish, or by a vote of two thirds expel, a member for 
disorderly behavior committed while the House is in session . . . [and] 
The Senators and Representatives, for any proper and legitimate 
speech or debate in either House, shall not be legally questioned in any 
other place. . . . but neither House may punish . . . any member or 
person for illegally questioning, when neither House is actually sitting, 
any Senator or Representative for any speech or debate. . . . 
In other words, by this new version of the Constitution, this House is 
powerless to punish any of its members who may choose, within an 
hour after the close of its session of each day, to question a fellow 
member for words uttered in debate, by waylaying him, and clubbing 
him until he is literally senseless and drenched in blood.36 
According to Bingham, Brooks confessed his crime against the 
people when he said his purpose was to punish Sumner for words 
 
 33. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 34(1) 1577 (1856). 
 34. Id. at 1578. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
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spoken in debate in the Senate.37  The attack was part of a larger attack 
on freedom of speech.  Without “free representative government, free 
speech, and free men” that nation would be “a world without a sun.”38 
The proposal to expel Brooks got 121 yes votes to 95 no votes; 
short of the constitutionally required two-thirds.  All but one of the 
Southern representatives voted no.  Brooks resigned, ran for re-election, 
and won.39 
Earlier, in March of 1856, Bingham had spoken in Congress on the 
Kansas contested election and expressed his concern with free speech 
and constitutional liberty.  Two delegates each claimed to be the one true 
representative to Congress for the government of Kansas.  The defenders 
of the pro-slavery government insisted that the candidate representing 
the slave state government was named in accordance with laws passed 
by the pro-slavery territorial assembly.  The free state claimant, they 
said, was estopped to challenge the Territorial laws. 
This claim led Bingham to examine other laws passed by the pro-
slavery Assembly.  The Kansas laws made it a felony punishable by 
death to carry slaves belonging to another out of the territory “with 
intent to effect the freedom of such slave.”  Similarly, the death penalty 
was provided for those who “aid[ed] in persuading” such an act.  Aiding 
or harboring an escaping slave in the territory was a five year felony.40 
The Kansas Assembly’s laws also targeted those expressing anti-
slavery views.  It was a felony “to print, or circulate, or publish, or aid in 
printing, circulating or publishing” in the Territory “any book, paper, 
pamphlet, magazine, handbill, or circular, containing any sentiment 
calculated to induce slaves to escape from the service of their masters.”  
Similarly the pro-slavery territorial assembly had made it a felony for 
free persons, “by speaking or writing, to assert that persons have not the 
right to hold slaves” in the Territory.41  By targeting anti-slavery speech, 
Kansas was following a trail blazed by the slave states.  The slave states 
had laws punishing speech that (if it reached slaves) would tend to make 
them discontent.  The fact that the speech was directed only to white 
citizens and reached no slaves was no defense.42 
 
 37. Id. at 1580. 
 38. Id.  
 39. DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS 221 at n. 44 (1976).  GLOBE, supra note 32, at 
34(1) 1349, 1627-1628; GLOBE, supra note 32, at 34(1) App. 831-833, 34(1) 1863. 
 40. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 34(1) Appendix 124, col. 1 (Mar. 6, 1856) (emphasis in 
original). 
 41. Id. at App. 124, col. 1 & 2 (emphasis in original). 
 42. See State v. Worth, 52 N.C. 488 (1860); CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 19 at chapter 
13. 
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Bingham insisted the territorial legislation was void because “it is 
not constitutional to restrict the freedom of speech within the Territories 
of the United States.”  Quoting John Milton, he said that “any territorial 
enactment which makes it a felony for a citizen of the United States, 
within the territory of the United States ‘to know, to argue, and to utter 
freely, according to conscience,’” was void because it violated “that 
provision of the Constitution which declares that the Congress . . . shall 
not pass any law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.”43  
Since Congress could not abridge freedom of speech, neither could its 
creature, the territorial assembly.  Bingham was dismayed by the Kansas 
gag laws.  He said: 
Congress is to abide by this statute, which makes it [a] felony for a 
citizen to utter or publish in that Territory “any sentiment calculated to 
induce slaves to escape from the service of their masters.”  Hence it 
would be [a] felony there to utter the strong words of Algernon Sidney, 
“resistence to tyrants is obedience to God;” a felony to say with 
Jefferson, “I have sworn upon the alter of my God eternal hostility to 
tyranny in every form over the mind and body of man;” a felony to 
utter there, in the hearing of a slave, upon American soil, beneath the 
American flag, the words of flame which shook the stormy soul of 
Henry, “Give me liberty or give me death;” a felony to read in the 
hearing of one of those fettered bondmen the words of the Declaration, 
“All men are born free and equal, and endowed by their Creator with 
inalienable rights of life and liberty;” . . . a felony to harbor a slave 
escaping from his thraldom; a felony to aid freedom in its flight. . . .  
Before you hold this enactment to be law, burn our immortal 
Declaration and our free-written Constitution, fetter our free press, and 
finally penetrate the human soul, and put out the light of that 
understanding which the . . . Almighty hath kindled.44 
Bingham concluded that the Kansas laws were unconstitutional in 
two respects: they abridged freedom of speech and of the press and 
deprived persons of liberty without due process of law.  In contrast, he 
said the Constitution expressly provided that ‘“Congress shall make no 
law abridging freedom of speech or of the press;’ and it expressly 
prescribes that ‘no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property 
without due process of law.’”45 
 
 43. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 34(1) App.  124, col. 2. 
 44. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 34(1) App. 124 (col.2-3) (emphasis in original). 
 45. Id. at App.124, col.3. 
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III.  BINGHAM, DUE PROCESS AND SLAVERY IN THE TERRITORIES 
Bingham, like other Republicans, read the Due Process Clause to 
outlaw slavery in the national territories.  New states beyond the original 
thirteen were “equal in respect of all the great and essential rights of a 
free Commonwealth, in respect of all rights sanctioned by the 
Constitution and consonant with its spirit” and equally had the right to 
“secure to each and every person therein the absolute enjoyment of the 
rights of human nature.”46 But new states formed “under and by virtue of 
the Constitution may [not] enslave its own children, and sell them like 
cattle.”47 
Bingham was a highly regarded lawyer.48  His constitutional 
arguments creatively wove together clauses of the Constitution and 
English and American constitutional history. 
The original states and new states were not equal in “the right to do 
wrong,” in the “privilege to trample on the rights of humanity.”  As 
Bingham saw it, constitutional protections for slavery were the unique 
possession of the original slave states.49  This view dovetailed with his 
view (and that of the Republican party)50 that slavery in the territories 
deprived the persons held as slaves of their liberty without due process 
of law. 
Bingham noted that the Constitutional Convention had rejected a 
provision for admission of new states on the same terms with the 
original states.  Before that, when the Continental Congress had 
provided for admission of new states from the Northwest Territory, it 
required the new states to adhere to certain unalterable conditions.  
These included perpetual guarantees of jury trial, habeas corpus, a 
provision that the governments must be republican, a prohibition on 
taking private property for public use without compensation, and finally 
a ban on slavery.  These provisions, he pointed out, were reenacted by 
the first Congress under the new Constitution.51 
Bingham supported his citation to the general provisions of the 
Northwest Ordinance with a specific case.  The Act to allow Ohio to 
 
 46. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 34(3) App. 136, col.2-3 (Jan. 13, 1857). 
 47. Id. at App. 136, col.3. 
 48. In 1866, the New York Times referred to Bingham and James Wilson as “among the most 
learned and talented” members of the House.  CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 15, 
at 120-21. 
 49. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 34(3) App. at 136, col. 3. 
 50. NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 1840-1956 at 27 (complied by Kirk H. Porter and Donald 
B. Johnson (1956). 
 51. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 34(3) at App.137, col.2-3. 
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form a constitution and to be admitted into the Union allowed its people 
to form a state government “provided the same shall be republican, and 
not repugnant to the [Northwest] ordinance.”52  These limitations on 
Ohio and other states continued after their admission. So Bingham 
concluded that similar limits “may and should be imposed by Congress” 
on territories.53 
Representatives of slave states insisted that the states had equal 
rights in the territories (which were common property of all the states). 
Therefore, slave owners had a right to bring their slaves into all the 
national territories.  In contrast, Bingham insisted that the territories 
belonged to the nation, not to the states.  The equal right of states to 
establish their institutions within the territories was impossible.  “The 
slaveholding states assert that men are property; the non-slaveholding 
states assert that men are not property, and cannot and shall not be made 
property!”54 
At any rate, Bingham said slavery in the territories violated the 
letter and spirit of the Constitution: 
You may call the State which enslaves and sells its own children, and 
manacles the hand which feeds and clothes and shelters it, republican; 
but truth, and history, and God’s eternal justice will call it 
despotism. . . .  I deny the constitutional right of any class of men . . . 
to establish such a government within the national Territories, under 
and by force of the national Constitution, because such a Government 
is subversive of the great objects for which that Constitution was 
ordained and violative of its spirit. . . . 
[T]he absolute equality of all, and the equal protection of each, are 
principles of our Constitution, which ought to be observed and 
enforced in the organization and admission of new States.  The 
Constitution provides . . . that no person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.  It makes no 
distinction either on account of complexion or birth–it secures these 
rights to all persons within its exclusive jurisdiction.  This is equality.  
It protects not only life and liberty, but also property, the product of 
labor.  It contemplates that no man shall be wrongfully deprived of the 
fruit of his toil any more than of his life.  The Constitution also 
provides that no title of nobility shall be granted by the United States, 
nor by any State of the Union.  Why this restriction?  Was it not 
because all are equal under the Constitution; and that no distinctions 
 
 52. Id. at App.138, col.1. 
 53. Id. at App. 139, col.1. 
 54. Id. at App.139, col.1. 
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should be tolerated except those which merit originates. . . .  It is an 
announcement of the equality and brotherhood of the human race.55 
Read quite literally, the Due Process Clause supports Bingham’s 
claim.  At least, it does so if one accepts  the idea that deprivation of 
liberty requires a judicial process–which no slaves had enjoyed before 
being deprived of liberty.  The due process claim also assumed that a 
better justification for deprivation of liberty would be required than the 
fact that one was descended from victims of kidnaping.  Blacks were 
held in slavery in the Kansas territory, but their enslavement and that of 
their ancestors had never been the result of a due process hearing or 
based on crime.  Instead, slavery originated in the forcible seizure of 
Africans, and the system was perpetuated by force. 
IV.  BINGHAM ON CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR AMERICAN 
CITIZENS–INCLUDING FREE BLACKS. 
Again in 1859, Bingham discussed the effect of the Due Process 
Clause in the territories.  He spoke against a bill to admit the Oregon 
territory as a state.  This time, however, Bingham addressed the 
protection he believed the Due Process Clause afforded to free blacks in 
the national territories. 
Bingham believed that the people of Oregon had an inherent right 
to form a constitution and seek admission as a state, even without an 
enabling act from Congress.  The right was inherent in their 
constitutional right to petition and in the idea of republican government.  
While the people of the Oregon territory had the right to frame a 
constitution for themselves, “they must so exercise that right as not to 
embody in their constitution provisions repugnant to the Constitution of 
the United States, violative of the rights of citizens of the United 
States.”56  That, as Bingham understood it, was exactly what Oregon had 
done.  The Oregon constitution forbade free blacks to enter Oregon or to 
remain there, to maintain court actions, or to own property in the state. 
“I know, sir,” Bingham said, “that some gentlemen have a short and 
easy method of disposing of such objections as these.”  These gentlemen 
assumed, “that the people of the State, after admission, may, by 
changing their constitution, insert therein every objectionable feature 
which, before admission, they were constrained to omit.”  Bingham 
denied that new states had the right to infringe on the Constitution and 
 
 55. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 34(3) App. 140, col. 1. 
 56. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 35(2) 982, col.1 & 2 (1859). 
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the rights of citizens.  But he thought the Constitution failed to provide 
any mechanism for enforcement of the citizens’ rights.  As a result, he 
did not deny that states might exercise the power to violate basic rights 
of citizens in the Bill of Rights.  He knew that many assumed that the 
new state had “the sole power over persons and property within its 
territorial limits” and might pass laws “however odious and 
unconstitutional.”57 
Bingham challenged the assumption.  “[A]ny State constitution, or 
State law, which conflicts with the Constitution of the United States and 
impairs any right, political or personal, guarantied thereby” was void 
because it violated the Supremacy Clause.  “To the right understanding 
of the limitation of the Constitution of the United States upon the several 
States, it ought not to be overlooked that, whenever the Constitution 
guaranties to its citizens a right, either natural or conventional, such 
guarantee is in itself a limitation upon the States. . . .”58 
To a great degree, that is the law today.  But how did Bingham 
understand it to be the law in 1859?  In 1859, the Fourteenth 
Amendment (ratified in 1868) did not exist, and the Supreme Court’s 
broad acceptance of the incorporation doctrine was not yet a gleam in 
the eye of Justice Black.  That doctrine grew from a judicial acorn in 
1925 to an oak by the end of the 1960s, but it had limited judicial 
support in 1859.59 
First, Bingham assumed that “[a]ll free persons born and domiciled 
within the jurisdiction of the United States, are citizens of the United 
States from birth.”  Bingham supported this assertion with citations from 
text writers such as Rawle and Chancellor Kent.60  But, Bingham noted, 
the Constitution did not merely protect citizens.  “[N]atural and inherent 
rights, which belong to all men irrespective of all conventional 
regulations, are by this constitution guarantied by the broad and 
comprehensive word ‘person,’ as contradistinguished from the limited 
term ‘citizens.’”  Here Bingham cited the text of “the fifth article of 
 
 57. Id. at 982, col.2. 
 58. Id. at 982, col.3. 
 59. It did have some.  E.g., Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846); Campbell v. State, 11 Ga. 353 
(1852).  See, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis, Historical Linguistics, Inkblots, and Life After Death: The 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the United States, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1071, 1118-1121 (2000) 
[hereinafter Curtis, Historical Linguistics]; William W. Crosskey, Charles Fairman, Legislative 
History, and the Constitutional Limits on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 141-42 (1954); 
CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 15, at 24 & 25 n. 36 (second printing, 1987).  See 
also, AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 169, 154-55, 
177, 189 (1998), for a luminous discussion. 
 60. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 35(2) 983, col.1. 
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amendments . . . that ‘no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property but by due process of law, nor shall private property be taken 
without just compensation.’” He continued: “And this guarantee applies 
to all citizens within the United States.”  The Supremacy Clause was a 
limit “upon State sovereignty–simple, clear and strong.  No State may 
rightfully . . . impair any of these guarantied rights. . .  They may not 
rightfully or lawfully declare that the strong citizens may deprive the 
weak citizens of their rights, natural or political. . . .”61 
Bingham has still not explained exactly how he thinks the rights of 
citizens enumerated in the Constitution limit the states.  The answer is 
coming. 
One of Bingham’s objections to the Oregon constitution was that it 
allowed aliens to vote, a provision he thought unconstitutional.  But that 
was not his main objection. 
But, sir, there is a still more objectionable feature than alien suffrage in 
this Oregon constitution.  That is the provision . . . which declares that 
large number of the citizens of the United States shall not, after the 
admission of . . . Oregon, come or be within said state: that they shall 
hold no property there and that they shall not prosecute any suits in any 
of the courts of the state; and that the legislature shall, by statute, make 
it a penal offense for any person to harbor any of the excluded class of 
their fellow-citizens who may thereafter come or be within the 
state. . . . I deny that any State may exclude a law abiding citizen of the 
United States from coming within its Territory, or abiding therein, . . .  
from the enjoyment therein of the “privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the United States. 
At this point Bingham cited Article IV, Section two: “The citizens 
of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens 
in the several States.”  He insisted that the “citizens of each State, all the 
citizens of each State, being citizens of the United States, shall be 
entitled to ‘all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several 
States.’” These were “[n]ot the rights and immunities of the several 
states.”  They were not “those constitutional rights and immunities 
which result exclusively from State authority or State legislation.”  
Instead they were “all privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
United States in the several States.  There is an ellipsis in the language 
employed in the Constitution, but its meaning is self-evident that it is 
‘the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States in the 
 
 61. Id. at 983, col.3. 
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several States’ that it guaranties.”62 
Bingham insisted that, 
the persons thus excluded from the State by this section of the Oregon 
constitution, are citizens by birth of the several States, and therefore 
are citizens of the United States, and as such are entitled to all the 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, amongst 
which are the rights of life, and liberty and property, and their due 
protection in the enjoyment thereof by law; and therefore I hold this 
section for their exclusion from that State and its courts, to be an 
infraction of that wise and essential provision of the national 
Constitution to which I before referred to wit: “The citizen of each 
states shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in 
the several states.”63 
As Bingham interpreted the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
Article IV, it protected all rights of citizens of the United States in every 
state.  When, in 1791, the nation added the Bill of Rights to the 
Constitution, new privileges and immunities or rights were created and 
these after acquired privileges and immunities, Bingham thought, were 
protected by the broad language of the original clause of Article IV.64 
Bingham rejected the claim that these rights were limited to whites. 
He pointed to a proposed “whites only” amendment to the Articles of 
Confederation that had been voted down in the Continental Congress.  
South Carolina had proposed to limit to white citizens the protection of 
the privileges and immunities provision in the Articles of Confederation 
(the predecessor of Article IV), but the proposal had been rejected. 65  
The refusal to limit the privileges of citizens under the Articles to whites 
was followed by the Constitution’s declaration that the new body politic 
was made up of “the people of the United States.”  This meant “all the 
free inhabitants of the United States, whether white or black, not even 
excepting, as did the Articles of Confederation, paupers, vagabonds, or 
 
 62. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 35(2) 984, col.1.  By 1871, when the protection for privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the United States was in Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
Bingham seemed to accept the orthodox judicial interpretation of Article IV privileges. Globe, 
supra note 32, at 42(1) App. 84, col. 2-3.  Bingham subsequently introduced a bill to give 
corporations the protection of the privileges of guaranteed by the Constitution to the citizens of the 
several states—apparently, Article IV privileges.  Id.  Presumably the bill was an attempt to give 
them pretty much what they now enjoy under the Court’s interpretation of the Dormant Commerce 
Clause.  See, GLOBE, supra note 32, at 41(1) 396. 
 63. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 35(2) 984, col.3. 
 64. William W. Crosskey, Charles Fairman, “Legislative History,” and the Constitutional 
Limitations on State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954). 
 65. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 35(2) 984, col.3. 
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fugitives from justice.”66  In addition, he noted that free blacks had voted 
in a number of the states at the time of the Constitution, adding further 
support to his claim that they were citizens of the United States.67 
After the ratification of the Constitution, all “free inhabitants, 
irrespective of age, or sex, or complexion, and their descendants, were 
citizens of the United States.  No distinctions were made against the 
poor and in favor of the rich, or against the free born blacks and in favor 
of the whites.”  As a result, “[t]his government rests upon the absolute 
equality of natural rights amongst men.”  Political rights, he admitted, 
were a different matter.68 
Bingham protested “against the attempt to mar that great charter of 
our rights, almost divine in its conception and in its spirit of equality, by 
the interpolation into it of any word of caste, such as white, or black, 
male or female. . . .”  The Constitution rested on the rock of the 
“equality of all to the right to live; to the right to know; to argue and to 
utter, according to conscience; to work and enjoy the product of their 
toil. . . .  The charm of that Constitution lies in the great democratic idea 
which it embodies, that all men, before the law, are equal in respect of 
those rights of person which God gives and no man or State may 
rightfully take away. . . .”69 
The Supreme Court had held to the contrary in the Dred Scott case, 
but Bingham had a low opinion of that decision and at any rate did not 
consider it binding on his independent duty to construe and uphold the 
Constitution.70  Judicial decisions were binding on the parties to a case, 
but they could not preclude the right of the people’s representatives to 
seek to enforce the Constitution as they understood it.  On another 
occasion, Bingham noted that judges could abuse their power.  The 
English  “judicial monster,” Judge Jeffreys, Chief Justice of the King’s 
Bench, “could boast a judicial massacre of three hundred and twenty 
victims.”  (Jeffrey’s was the judge who presided over the conviction of 
Algernon Sidney, later a hero to American Revolutionaries, for writing a 
book supporting republican government.  Jeffries is widely regarded as 
one of the worst judges in English history.)  The experience of such past 
judicial abuses precluded excessive deference to decisions of judges by 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 35(2) 985, col.1.  These would, of course, include the right to 
vote and hold office. 
 69. Id. at 985, col.2. 
 70. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 36(1) 1839.  See also GLOBE, supra note 32, at 40(2) 483, col.2. 
(1868). 
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the people’s representatives.  “With such an example before us, we, the 
lineal descendants of those who witnessed and avenged Jeffreys’s 
judicial crimes, are not to be told that the judiciary are, at pleasure, and 
by the assumption of power, to bind the conscience and dispose of the 
liberties and lives of the people!”71 
A slim majority in the House voted to admit Oregon.  The bill had 
already passed the Senate, so Oregon was admitted.72  The Civil Rights 
Act of 1866 and then the Fourteenth Amendment ratified in 1868 
prohibited racist laws of the sort contained in the Oregon Constitution. 
V.  THE FIREEATERS REVISITED: FREE SPEECH ON THE EVE OF THE 
CIVIL WAR 
The controversy over slavery was a dispute about the deeper 
meaning of our national story.  It was a struggle for the nation’s soul.  
Would the American constitutional system protect slavery or guarantee 
liberty?  The dispute was intense because slavery undermined liberty and 
liberty threatened slavery.  As slaveowners saw it, protection of the slave 
system required suppression of dissent, search and destroy missions 
aimed at anti-slavery publications, and whipping and prison for those 
who criticized the system. 
The dispute was intense in January of 1860, on the eve of the Civil 
War.  Nearly half of the Republicans in the House of Representatives 
had endorsed a project to publish an abridged version of an anti-slavery 
book by Hinton Helper.  The book was to be a Republican campaign 
document for the election of 1860. 
In his book, Helper advocated abolition of slavery by democratic 
action at the state level.  He called on white Southerners to follow the 
example of the Northern states and to eliminate slavery state by state.  
Helper said change should be achieved by free speech and the ballot, by 
the force of argument, not force of arms.  But if slaveholders and “their 
cringing lickspittles” used violence to suppress anti-slavery speech, 
Helper said the advocates of emancipation should fight back.  There 
were, he pointed out, three non-slaveholders to each slaveholder, “not 
counting the negroes who in nine cases out of ten would be delighted to 
cut their masters throats.”73  The Southern elite and their Northern allies 
were outraged by the book. 
John Sherman, the Republican candidate for Speaker, had endorsed 
 
 71. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 36(1) 1839, col.3 (1860). 
 72. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 35(2) 1010 and 1011. 
 73. CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 19, at 271-74. 
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the plan to publish an abridged version of Helper’s book.  As a result, 
the battle over who would be Speaker of the House in 1859-1860 
erupted into a battle over Helper’s book, slavery, abolition, and the 
recent John Brown raid.  Southern representatives contended (quite 
inaccurately) that Brown’s raid was implicitly condoned by the course of 
action advocated by the book.  They also claimed that Republican 
endorsers were accessories to John Brown’s crime.  Several suggested 
that like Brown, these Republican endorsers should be hung.  Certainly 
no endorser should be elected Speaker.74  One prominent Republican 
endorser was John Bingham. 
Congressman William Smith of Virginia insisted that Bingham, as 
one of the endorsers, deserved “the detestation and scorn and indignation 
of every party and every man in the American Union.”  At this point the 
report in the Congressional Globe noted “applause in the galleries.”  In 
response to Congressman Smith’s attack, Bingham asked Smith if he 
repudiated “the self evident truths of the Declaration, that all men are 
created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable rights, among which are the right to life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness. . . .”  Bingham’s question was pertinent.  The 
Helper book reprinted anti-slavery statements from Thomas Jefferson, 
from Southerners of the Founding generation, and from Virginians in 
their 1832 state debate over ending slavery.  Smith responded: “the 
gentleman refers to the sentiments of distinguished revolutionary men, 
and asks me if I repudiate them.  Sir, many of those sentiments, of 
course, I repudiate.  [Derisive laughter from the Republicans.]  Many of 
those sentiments are false in philosophy and untrue in fact.”75  By this 
time a number of Southern congressmen had explicitly disowned the 
Declaration’s assertion that all men are created equal.76 
Bingham had said the Framers repudiated the use of the term 
slavery.  Smith asked if the fugitive slave clause did not disprove the 
claim.  “What was it there for?  Tell me; tell me. Speak. I demand that 
you. . .stand up here and respond to my question.”  Bingham rejoined, 
“Whenever the gentleman addresses me as his peer I will respond; but I 
wish him to know that I am not his slave.”  Smith rejoined, “I would 
make you do better if you were. [Laughter.] You would get what you 
need.”77 
 
 74. Id. at chapter 12. 
 75. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 36(1) 436, col.3. 
 76. E.g., CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 19, at 296 (Statement of Senator James Chestnut); 
cf. also the statement of Alexander Stephens, in McPherson, supra note 5. 
 77. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 36(1) 437, col.1. 
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As Bingham noted, Southerners and some Northern Democrats 
were attempting “to arraign and condemn sixty of their peers here as the 
aiders and inciters of treason, insurrection, and murder; and this, too, 
without giving the accused a hearing, without testimony. . . .”  It was, he 
said, an attempt “to enforce mob law on this floor,” a reference to the 
Northern mobs that had tried to silence opponents of slavery in the 
decades before the Civil War.78 
Bingham’s free speech concerns were part of the common faith of 
the Republican party.  In the debate over Helper’s book, Republicans in 
the Senate voted for a resolution that upheld the right of free speech on 
slavery and all topics of state and national concern: “[F]ree discussion of 
the morality and expediency of slavery should never be interfered with 
by the law of any State, or of the United States; and the freedom of 
speech and of the press on this and every other subject of domestic and 
national policy, should be maintained inviolate in all the States.”79 
For Bingham, free speech was a central part of the controversy over 
slavery.  President Buchanan and his party blamed sectional strife on the 
Republicans.  Bingham responded that “sectional strife will never be 
allayed” by “the attempt, here or elsewhere, either by national or by 
State legislation, to enact sedition laws, by which to fetter the 
conscience, or stifle the convictions, of American citizens.”80  Again and 
again, Bingham noted the denials of free speech and press that 
accompanied slavery.  “Mr. Underwood was driven away from the State 
of Virginia” because “as a citizen of the State, he insisted on the right of 
discussing this [slavery] question among her people, and dared to attend 
the Republican convention” of 1856 in Philadelphia.  Similarly, a large 
pro-slavery mob had assembled to prevent citizens from holding a 
Republican party meeting in Wheeling, Virginia.81  Bingham said these 
events proceeded from mercenary considerations.  “It is the wealthy men 
of the South who have their investments in slaves, who ostracize the 
friends of emancipation. . . .”  These men feared that “if free speech is 
tolerated and free labor protected by law,” it “would bring into disrepute 
the system of slave labor, and bring about, if you please, gradual 
emancipation, thereby interfering with the profits of these gentlemen.”82 
By 1860, Southern states were treating anti-slavery speech as 
criminal.  Bingham noted that it had not always been so.  In the 1830s, 
 
 78. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 36 (1) 1837, col.1 (1860). 
 79. CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 19, at 286-87. 
 80. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 36 (1) 1837, col.2. 
 81. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 36(1) 1861, col.2. 
 82. Id. at 1861, col.3. 
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Maryland, Kentucky, and Virginia had openly debated abolishing the 
institution, but faced with the danger of emancipation, the Southern elite 
renewed sectional strife.83  “[T]o maintain as a finality . . . [the fugitive 
slave law of 1850] this sectional party attempted to muzzle the press, 
and stifle the lowest whisper of the national conscience. . . .”84 
In January 1861, Bingham spoke in the House against a 
compromise measure proposed in an effort to avert civil war.  Bingham 
feared that one provision would be construed to allow for federal 
extradition for trial in the Southern states of those who spoke or wrote 
against slavery or aided those who had–and whose words reached or 
were uttered in the South.  This was no idle concern.  In North Carolina, 
Daniel Worth, a minister who distributed copies of the Helper book, had 
been convicted of a felony and sentenced to prison. After Worth’s trial, 
the North Carolina legislature changed its law against “incendiary 
documents” to provide capital punishment for the first offense. Nor was 
North Carolina satisfied with prosecuting local “agitators.”  A North 
Carolina grand jury had called for the extradition of Northern 
Republican endorsers of the Helper book. 
In response to the danger that the federal government might 
legislate for  extradition, Bingham denied “that citizens of the United 
States are to be made liable, by force of Federal law, for merely political  
offenses against the States.”  Why?  “Because it is written in the 
Constitution that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of 
speech or the freedom of the press.”  As a result, Congress could not 
provide for the rendition of a person who had taught a South Carolina 
slave to read nor could it enforce the extradition of a person who had 
published “an article against slavery, contrary to the statutes of that 
state.”85   
For Bingham, suppression of free speech was part of a larger attack 
on liberty in the interests of slavery.  Bingham summarized what he saw 
as the aggressions of the slave power: 
[T]he repeal of laws for the protection of freedom and free labor in the 
Territories; the conquest of foreign territory for slavery; the admission 
into the Union of a foreign slave state; the rejection by this sectional 
party of the homestead bill; the restriction of the right of petition; the 
restoration of fugitive slaves at national expense; the attempt to reward 
slave pirates for kidnapping Africans; the attempt to acquire Cuba, 
with her six hundred thousand slaves; the attempt to fasten upon an 
 
 83. Id. at 1837, col.3. 
 84. Id. at 1839, col.1 
 85. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 36(2) App. 84, col.1 (1861). 
25
Curtis: The Story of American Liberty
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2003
NEWCURTIS.DOC 7/28/03  11:48 AM 
642 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:617 
unwilling people a slave constitution; the attempt to enact a sedition 
law, thereby restricting the freedom of the press and the freedom of 
speech, in direct violation of the Constitution . . .; and the attempt, by 
extra-judicial interference to take away from the people and their 
Representatives the power to legislate for freedom and free labor in the 
Territories.86 
From the 1850s to the eve of the Civil War, Bingham saw himself 
defending basic American values under attack from the slave power–the 
interrelated values of equality and basic constitutional rights.  Soon, 
however, the battle against the slave power entered a new, revolutionary, 
and bloody phase. 
VI.  JOHN BINGHAM DURING THE CIVIL WAR 
When the war came, Bingham and his Republican colleagues had 
the chance to put their anti-slavery convictions into action.  In April of 
1862, John Bingham spoke in favor of a statute that abolished slavery in 
the District of Columbia.  By abolishing slavery in the District, Bingham 
thought the Congress was making good on the promise of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
Bingham noted that the Magna Charta of England differed widely 
from “the broader and wiser provision of our own American Magna 
Charta.”  The English provision “only protected from unjust seizure, 
imprisonment, disseizen, and banishment those fortunate enough to be 
known as FREEMEN.”  In contrast Bingham said, “our Constitution, the 
new Magna Charta. . .rejects in its bill of rights the restrictive word 
‘freeman,’ and adopts in its stead the more comprehensive words ‘no 
person:’ thus giving protection to all, whether born free or bond.”87  (As 
noted earlier, Bingham thought the Due Process Clause prevented 
slavery in the territories and the District of Columbia where the power of 
the national government was exclusive.) 
The American Constitution provided that “‘no person shall be 
deprived of life, or liberty, or property without due process of law.’  This 
clear recognition of the rights of all was a new gospel to mankind, 
something unknown to the men of the thirteenth century. . . .”88 
The barons of England demanded the security of law for themselves; 
the patriots of America proclaimed the security and protection for all. 
[A]ll men are equal before the law.  No matter upon what spot of the 
 
 86. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 36(1) 1840, col.2-3 (1860). 
 87. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 37(2) 1638, col.2 (1862). 
 88. Id. 
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earth’s surface they were born; no matter whether an Asiatic or 
African, a European or an American sun first burned upon them; no 
matter whether citizens or strangers; no matter whether rich or poor; no 
matter whether wise or simple; no matter whether strong or weak, this 
new Magna Charta to mankind declares the rights of all to life and 
liberty and property are equal before the law. . . .”89 
Bingham noted that this provision unfortunately had been ignored 
for sixty years in the Capital where the United States government had 
exclusive jurisdiction.  Now, however, “no person, no human being, no 
member of the family of man shall, . . . under the sanction of the Federal 
authority . . ., be deprived of his life, or his liberty, or his property, but 
by the law of the land . . . the law of the whole people of United 
States. . . .”90  Bingham said that the Due Process Clause was in keeping 
with the spirit of the Declaration’s proclamation that all men are created 
equal.  The Declaration, in turn, was a reiteration of the Gospel’s 
proclamation that God had “made of one blood all nations to dwell on 
the face of the earth.”91 
In this speech Bingham also reiterated his ellipsis theory.  The 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV protected “all privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the United States in the several States. . . .  
The great privilege and immunity of an American citizen to be respected 
everywhere in this land, and especially in this District, is that they shall 
not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law.”92  Article IV, Bingham pointed out, protected the privileges and 
immunities of citizens in the several states, not of the several states.93  
The result was a body of national constitutional privileges and 
immunities belonging to every citizen in every state. 
Dred Scott notwithstanding, Congress voted to abolish slavery in 
the nation’s capital.  The House approved the Senate bill to free all 
slaves in the District, and  Lincoln signed the emancipation act on April 
16, 1862.94 
In times of war, traditional liberties are imperiled.  On at least one 
occasion, Bingham worked to limit broad government power in the 
interest of the liberty of the citizen. The Lincoln administration had 
suspended the writ of habeas corpus.  People were detained without a 
 
 89. Id. at 1638, col.2-3. 
 90. Id. at 1638, col.3. 
 91. Id. at 1639, col.3. 
 92. Id. at 1639, col.2. 
 93. Id. 
 94. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 37(2) 1648. 
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statement of charges.  On July 7, 1862, Bingham reported a bill from the 
Judiciary Committee on the subject.  It affirmed the suspension of the 
writ, but required the administration to furnish a list of the names of 
prisoners.  It also required that prisoners who were held where the 
federal courts were functioning should be charged before the end of the 
term of the grand jury or released on taking an oath of allegiance.95  
Bingham noted that the power to suspend the writ was subject to great 
abuse, however the bill was worded. But he said that the bill was 
important both for the protection of the executive and the protection of 
the rights of the citizen.96  On the other hand, when some of Lincoln’s 
generals suppressed anti-war speech, Bingham does not seem to have 
joined the Republicans who protested the suppression. 
VII.  THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM 
With the end of the Civil War, the defeated Southern states ratified 
the Thirteenth Amendment abolishing slavery.  After ratification, the 
Southern states insisted they should be restored to representation in 
Congress–with the increased political power that came from the 
abolition of the Three-fifths Clause.  Under the constitutional rule after 
passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, Southern blacks, though 
disfranchised, would count as whole people for purposes of 
representation.  The rebels who had lost the war might win the peace, 
riding to political victory on the backs of disfranchised blacks.  Bingham 
was a member of the Joint Committee that had been appointed to 
consider conditions for re-admission, including constitutional 
amendments.  Like most Republicans, he insisted further constitutional 
guarantees were necessary before Southern states could be re-admitted 
to Congress.97 
On January 25, 1866, Bingham defended one proposed guarantee, a 
constitutional amendment to modify the apportionment of 
representatives among the states.  The proposal under discussion became 
section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In its final form, it 
proportionally reduced the representation of states that excluded any 
portion of their adult male population from voting for any reason except 
rebellion or other crime. 
The provision faced strong opposition from those who sought to 
secure the ballot to newly freed slaves.  They claimed it legitimized 
 
 95. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 37(2) 3105, col.3-3106, col.1. 
 96. Id. at 3106, col.1. 
 97. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 39(1) 429, col.1 & 2. 
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disfranchisement of the black men of the South.  Bingham rejected the 
claim.  The amendment  was a penalty for disfranchisement, he said, not 
permission to do it.98 
Bingham said no issue was more important than the basis of 
representation would come before Congress unless it was “the great 
question whether the Constitution shall be so amended as to give to 
Congress power by statute law to enforce all of its guarantees!”99  
Bingham prefaced his statement about enforcing all constitutional 
guarantees with an example of the abuses he wished to correct.  He 
hoped that “amendments will be sent out to the people by which the 
Congress may upon their ratification be empowered to provide by law 
that hereafter no State shall make it a crime for a man, whether he be 
black or white, a citizen of the Republic, to learn the alphabet of his 
native tongue and his rights and duties.”100  Southern states, of course, 
had made it a crime to teach slaves to read. 
On February 26, 1866, Bingham introduced the proposed 
amendment of which he had spoken (the February 26th version).  It gave 
Congress power to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and 
immunities of citizens in the several states and to all persons in the 
several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.  
Because of the Supremacy Clause, Bingham said, states did not have the 
right, though they had exercised the power, to deprive citizens of their 
constitutional rights. “[T]his immortal bill of rights embodied in the 
Constitution rested for its execution and enforcement hitherto on the 
fidelity of the States.”  The states, however, had “violated in every sense 
of the word these provisions of the Constitution of the United States, the 
enforcement of which are absolutely essential to American 
nationality.”101 
Bingham’s proposal faced several objections.  Congressman Hale 
of New York believed that the equal protection provision would allow 
Congress to legislate on all subjects heretofore reserved to the states, 
with the simple limit that the legislation must be equal.  Hale thought it 
could allow Congress to make the property rights of married women 
equal to those of men–an issue he thought should be reserved for the 
 
 98. Id. at  432, col.1-3. 
 99. Id. at col. 3. 
 100. Id. 
 101. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 39(1) 1034, c.1-2.  Some have claimed Bingham’s references to 
“the Bill of Rights” meant not the Bill of Rights but only the due process clause and the privileges 
and immunities clause of Article IV.  The claim is a mistake.  See, e.g., CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL 
ABRIDGE, supra note 15, at 102.  Note also Bingham’s reference to enforcing all the guarantees of 
the Constitution, most of which are contained in the Bill of Rights.  Id. 
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states.  Furthermore, Hale said the Bill of Rights cited by Bingham was a 
limit on state and federal legislation, not a source of power.  Bingham 
agreed that under current law  the Bill of Rights was a limit on power, 
not a source of power.  But, unlike Hale, Bingham was aware of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions holding that the guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights did not limit state power. 
Bingham interrupted Hale to ask for a single decision requiring 
states to allow the most basic form of due process.  Had not the nation 
been “dumb in the presence of” state laws that closed the courts of the 
state to some American citizens denying them the right to prosecute a 
suit.  (Here Bingham was referring to laws like the Oregon law he had 
opposed.)  Hale said that he assumed, somehow or other, that the 
Constitution protected the liberties of American citizens, but admitted 
that he might be mistaken.102 
In a later speech, Bingham summarized his proposal.  It was 
“simply a proposition to arm the Congress of the United States, by the 
consent of the people of the United States, with the power to enforce the 
bill of rights as it stands in the Constitution today.”103 
Bingham quoted the two provisions of his proposed amendment.  
His critics, he said, “admit the force of the provisions in the bill of 
rights, that the citizens of the United States shall be entitled to all the 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States in the several 
States, and that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property 
without due process of law.”  But they were opposed “to the 
enforcement of the bill of rights, as proposed” because of the reserved 
rights of the states.  Bingham denied that any state had reserved to itself 
the right, “under the Constitution of the United States, to withhold from 
any citizen of the United States within its limits, under any pretext 
whatever, any of the privileges of a citizen of the United States” or to 
impose any burden on him contrary to the constitutional injunction “that 
the citizen shall be entitled in the several States to all the immunities of a 
citizen of the United States.”104 Bingham recognized that states had 
exercised the power to deny these protections to citizens.  But unlike 
others, Bingham thought that Congress lacked the ability to correct these 
abuses without a constitutional amendment. 
Bingham said he had been asked if he could cite a decision showing 
that “the power of the Federal Government to enforce in the United 
 
 102. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 39(1) 1064, col. 3. 
 103. Id. at 1088, col.3. 
 104. Id. at 1089, col.1. 
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States courts the bill of rights under the articles of amendment to the 
constitution had been denied.”105  Bingham had not been given the 
chance to answer the question—specifically whether the Constitution 
was adequate as it stood to protect the liberties of the citizen.106  Though 
unable to discuss the question further during Hale’s speech, Bingham 
answered it in a speech he made the very next day. 
Bingham said the federal government could not enforce Bill of 
Rights liberties against the states.  To prove the point he cited Barron v. 
Baltimore and Livingston v. Moore.  In those cases, the Supreme Court 
had held the guarantees of the Bill of Rights were merely limits on the 
federal government and did not limit the states.  “Is the bill of rights,” 
Bingham asked, “to stand in our Constitution hereafter  . . . a mere dead 
letter?”  While the government could protect “the personal liberty and all 
the personal rights of the citizen on the remotest sea,” it lacked the 
power “in time of peace to enforce the citizens’ rights to life, liberty, and 
property within the limits of South Carolina” after the state was 
readmitted.107 
As Bingham (and other leading Republicans saw it) Congress 
should have the power to protect citizens’ constitutional rights.  
Bingham insisted the power was insufficient under the existing 
Constitution.  “A grant of power . . . is a very different thing from a bill 
of rights.”  Would anyone say “that the bill of rights confers express 
legislative power on Congress to punish State officers for . . . flagrantly 
unjust violations of the declared rights of every citizen and every free 
man in every free State?”108 
Republican critics of Bingham’s proposed amendment expressed 
two concerns.  The first was the fear that the amendment would allow 
Congress to legislate on every imaginable subject, preempt all state laws, 
and substitute the laws of Congress instead.  The second was that 
Bingham’s mere grant of power failed to secure fully the rights Bingham 
was trying to protect.  As Giles Hotchkiss put it, “we may pass laws here 
to-day, and the next Congress may wipe them out.  Where is your 
guarantee then?”109  Hotchkiss wanted an express limit on the states that 
hostile legislation could not override.110 
 
 105. Id. at 1089, col.3. 
 106. Id. at 1064, col.3 (Bingham, Hale, and Eldridge). 
 107. Id. at 1090, col.2. 
 108. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 39(1) 1093, col.3. 
 109. Id. at 1095, col. 2. 
 110. Id. at 1095 col.1-2. 
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VIII.  THE CIVIL RIGHTS BILL: CONGRESSIONAL POWER ASSERTED 
On February 28, 1866, the first version of Bingham’s amendment 
was postponed, and Congress turned to the Civil Rights Bill.  That bill 
was a response to Black Codes passed by the Southern states.  These 
codes denied blacks rights to contract, own property, testify against 
whites, live in towns, or even travel without permission from their 
employers.  In short, the Codes attempted to replace slavery with 
serfdom.  Some of the codes also had provisions that directly limited 
rights of blacks to assemble, to speak, to preach and to bear arms.  They 
also inflicted cruel and unusual punishments on the transgressors.111 
The Civil Rights Act, as finally passed, made all persons born in 
the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United 
States.  It gave all citizens the same rights to contract, testify, and own 
property as enjoyed by white citizens.  It also guaranteed them the full 
and equal benefit of all laws and provisions for the security of person 
and property as enjoyed by white citizens.112  The phrase “laws for the 
security of person and property” had long been understood to encompass 
guarantees such as those in the Bill of Rights.113  A number of 
 
 111. 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 279-81 (Walter L. Fleming ed., 1906).  
Michael Kent Curtis, Resurrecting the Privileges or Immunities Clause and Revising the Slaughter-
House Cases without Exhuming Lochner: Individual Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 38 B. 
C. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1996). 
 112. Act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27. 
 113. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. 393,  449-50; CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 15, at 
72.  In Dred Scott, Taney noted that Congress could make no law respecting the establishment of 
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech and of the press, 
or the right to bear arms.  These powers, he said, limit the power of the federal government over the 
“person or property” of the citizen. 
These powers, and others, in relation to rights of person. . .are in express and positive 
terms, denied to the General Government; and the rights of private property have been 
guarded with equal care.  Thus the rights of property are united with the rights of person, 
and placed on the same ground by the fifth amendment to the Constitution, which 
provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process 
of law. 
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 450. 
In the 1827 edition of his Commentaries, Kent notes that “[t]he right of personal security is 
guarded by provisions which have been  transcribed into the constitutions of this country from 
Magna Charta, and other fundamental acts of the English Parliament, and it is enforced by 
additional and more precise injunctions.”  Kent proceeds to list guarantees such as grand jury 
indictment, the protection against double jeopardy, the provision that no person shall be compelled 
to be a witness against himself, and the guarantees of speedy and public trial, confrontation, 
compulsory process, right to counsel, and against ex post facto laws.  Kent explicitly noted the dual 
nature of laws and provisions for the security of person. “[T]he personal security of every citizen is 
protected from lawless violence, by the arm of government, and the terrors of the penal code; 
and. . .it is equally guarded from unjust and tyrannical proceedings on the part of government itself, 
by the provisions to which we have referred.”  See, GLOBE, supra note 32, at 39(1) 1117 and 1118, 
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Republicans read the provisions of the Civil Rights Act to protect the 
Bill of Rights liberties of American citizens in the states.114 
In spite of Bingham’s view that Congress lacked the constitutional 
power to pass the Civil Rights Bill, several distinguished Republican 
lawyers in the House disagreed.  They thought congressional power to 
enforce the Bill of Rights did provide a source of power to pass the Civil 
Rights Bill.  One of these was James Wilson, chair of the House 
Judiciary Committee.  Wilson found congressional power to pass the 
Civil Rights Act in the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.115  
He and other congressmen also relied on the power to enforce the 
Thirteenth Amendment. 
Ironically, Bingham opposed passage of the Civil Rights Bill.  He 
insisted that a constitutional amendment was necessary.  “I do not,” he 
said, “oppose any legislation which is authorized by the Constitution of 
my country to enforce in its letter and spirit the bill of rights as 
embodied in that Constitution.  I know that enforcement of the bill of 
rights is the want of the republic.”116  But, he said, under current law, 
protection of these rights was reserved to the states.117  Bingham said he 
agreed with Wilson “in an earnest desire to have the bill of rights in your 
Constitution enforced everywhere.”118  But, he insisted, Congress simply 
lacked the power without a constitutional amendment.  Bingham would 
make similar objections in 1867 to passage of a bill to forbid cruel and 
unusual punishments in the states.  He insisted that Congress needed to 
wait until the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. 
 
col.3 (Rep. Wilson) and 1757, col.3 (Sen. Trumbull) both citing Chancellor Kent.  JAMES KENT, I 
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW Lecture XXIV, 599-648 (New York: William Kent, 1854).  
Robert Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and 
Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 923, 932 (1986) (citing Kent).  The references to the 1827 
edition appear in JAMES KENT, II COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW,  Section XXIV, Of the 
Absolute Rights of Persons, at 9-11 (1827). 
 114. CURTIS, supra note 19, at 373-74; GLOBE, supra note 32, at 39(1) 2332, col. 3 (Sen. 
Dixon) (“Congress has given us, in the civil rights act, a guarantee for free speech in every part of 
the Union.”); cf. also Id. at 2465, col. 1 (Rep. Thayer); Id. at 2468, col. 1 (Rep. Kelly, suggesting 
that the provisions of section one—which include requiring states to accord due process—may 
already be in the Constitution); Id. at 2539, col. 3 (Rep. Farnsworth—all provisions in section one 
are in the Constitution already—which would include the due process clause as a limit on the 
states—except for equal protection). CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 30, at 72, 104.  
AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 245 (1998); STEPHEN 
P. HALBROOK, THE FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS, 
1866-1876, at 31 and 60 (citing N.Y. EVENING POST, Apr. 7, 1866 at 2 col. 1(1998). 
 115. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 39(1) 1294, col.2 & 3 (Wilson). 
 116. Id. at 1291, col. 1. 
 117. Id. at 1291. 
 118. Id. 
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Bingham continued to defend the February 26th version of his 
amendment against federalism concerns.  He said his amendment was 
not designed to replace the states.  It was simply designed to “punish all 
violations by State officers of the bill of rights, but leaving those officers 
to discharge their duties” in a way consistent with the oath to obey the 
Constitution.119 
In addition to his belief that Congress lacked the constitutional 
power to pass it, Bingham objected to the Civil Rights Bill because it 
failed to protect the due process rights of aliens.  “Can such legislation 
be sustained,” he asked, “by reason and conscience?”120  If the Supreme 
Court was right, and the Bill of Rights did not limit the states, at least it 
limited the federal government and protected aliens.121 
IX.  SECTION ONE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Bingham was nothing if not persistent.  When his proposed 
amendment was postponed, he re-wrote it in its present form (except for 
the citizenship clause that was added by the Senate.)  When the Joint 
Committee rejected it, Bingham came back again.  After several close 
votes, the Joint Committee eventually endorsed Bingham’s proposed 
revised language: “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws.” 
On May 10, 1866, in his final speech to the Congress before the 
vote on the Fourteenth Amendment, Bingham explained that it would 
allow congress to do by congressional enactment what it had never been 
able to do.  Congress would be able to “protect by national law the 
privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic and the 
inborn rights of every person within its jurisdiction whenever the same 
shall be abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State.”122  
The power was needed because many flagrant “violations of the 
guarantied privileges of citizens of the United States” had occurred, and 
the national government could not provide a remedy.  For example, 
“[c]ontrary to the express letter of your Constitution, ‘cruel and unusual 
 
 119. Id. at 1292. 
 120. Id. at 1292, col. 1. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 2542 col.2-3. 
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punishments’ have been inflicted under State laws. . . .”123 
In 1867, the Fourteenth Amendment had not yet been ratified by the 
necessary number of states.  Appalled by degrading punishments being 
inflicted in some of the former slave states, Representative John Kasson 
of Iowa introduced a bill to prevent cruel and unusual punishments.  He 
said it was the duty of the Congress “to take early action to prevent what 
is now both cruel and unusual from becoming simply cruel and usual.”  
According to Kasson, his bill applied “to all the States of the Union.  It 
protects both whites and blacks. . . .”124  Kasson said the bill was “using 
the power conferred by the Constitution to protect personal rights in this 
country.”  He did “not think there can be any reasonable doubt of the 
power of Congress to protect personal rights guarantied by the 
Constitution.”  In support of his proposition he noted that the 
“Constitution says that the citizens of one State shall have all the 
privileges and immunities of citizens in any other State, and I think 
Congress has the right to protect our citizens in the enjoyment of these 
rights.”125 
Once again, John Bingham pointed out decisions holding the Bill of 
Rights limited the powers of Congress, but not the powers of the states.  
Bingham favored doing what could be done to prevent cruel and unusual 
punishments.  He said that when “the pending constitutional amendment 
will become part of the supreme law of the land,” Congress would be 
empowered “to enforce every one of those limitations so essential to 
justice and humanity.”  His next response may have been influenced by 
the fact that blacks were the main victims of these degrading 
punishments.  As quoted in the report in the Globe, Bingham referred to 
the amendment “by which no State may deny to any person the equal 
protection of the laws, including all the limitations for personal 
protection of every article and section of the Constitution.”126 
In July of 1868, the Secretary of State proclaimed that the necessary 
number of states had ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.  Section one of 
the Amendment is Bingham’s great achievement.  It embodied his 
passionate concern for liberty and equality.  From the 1930s to the 
1960s, and continuing to this day, the Fourteenth Amendment has 
become a major vehicle for protection of both values. 
The amendment established basic legal principles.  In the 1930s and 
later, the Court began applying the principles, translating them into the 
 
 123. Id. at 2542 col.3. 
 124. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 39(2) 810, col. 3. 
 125. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 39(2) 811, col. 1. 
 126. Id. at 811, col.2. 
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world of the twentieth century.  Of course, the later application did not 
always follow the way Bingham or his contemporaries thought the 
provisions would be applied.  Examples include segregation and 
application of the equal protection clause in a way that would have 
voided laws from the 1860s that restricted the legal rights of married 
women.127  The world had radically changed.  Even the Constitution 
itself had undergone significant changes after 1868, by prohibiting 
denial of the right to vote based on race or sex.  What appeared rational 
to many in 1866 looked arbitrary and unreasonable to most in 1954 or in 
the 1970s. 
X.  RECONSTRUCTION 
Passage of the Fourteenth Amendment had not solved the 
continuing conflict between liberty and the legacy of slavery.  In March 
of 1871, the House was considering a bill to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment against Ku Klux Klan violence.  The Klan was using 
political terrorism against black and white Republicans as part of a plan 
by self styled “Redeemers” forcibly to eject Republicans and their black 
allies from political power in the Southern states.128  As Bingham saw it, 
the issue was the “enforcement of the Constitution on behalf of the 
whole people . . . on behalf of every individual citizen of the Republic in 
every state and Territory to the extent of the rights guarantied to him by 
the Constitution.”129 
Critics of the legislation, including some prominent Republicans, 
suggested that the change in the constitutional language from Bingham’s 
February 26th version130 to the “no state shall” version meant that 
congressional enforcement power was now limited to state action.131  By 
this theory congressional power could reach state officers who were 
depriving citizens of constitutional protections, but not the “private” 
Klansmen who were inflicting a reign of terror on Republicans.  In this 
case, however, Republican state office holders were not the problem.  
They were among the victims.  The problem was the Klan. 
 
 127. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 39(1) 1063, 1064, col. 1-2; Id. at 1089, col. 3; Id. at 1292, col. 3; 
Id. at cf., 1294, col. 2. 
 128. E.g., PAUL ESCOTT, MANY EXCELLENT PEOPLE: POWER AND PRIVILEGE IN NORTH 
CAROLINA, 1850-1900, 151-170 (1985); VERNON L. WHARTON, THE NEGRO IN MISSISSIPPI 1865-
1890 (1965); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION,: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, 
at 425-59 (1998). 
 129. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 42(1) App. 81, col.2. (1871). 
 130. The prototype gave Congress power to enforce privileges and immunities and equal 
protection in the rights of life, liberty and property. 
 131. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 42(1) App.114-116 (Farnsworth), App.  150-54 (Garfield). 
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Bingham insisted that the equal protection clause meant that no 
state could deny to any person within its jurisdiction “the equal 
protection of the Constitution of the United States, as that Constitution is 
the supreme law. . . .”132  He insisted that Section one plus the 
enforcement clause of Section five provided ample congressional power 
to reach both state actors and private conspirators. 
In explaining why he changed the form of the amendment, 
Bingham said that he had re-read Barron v. Baltimore. 
In reexamining the case of Barron, . . . , after my struggle in the House 
in February, 1866, I noted and apprehended as I never did before, 
certain words in that opinion of Marshall. Referring to the first eight 
articles of amendments to the Constitution of the United States, the 
Chief Justice said: “Had the framers of these amendments intended 
them to be limitations on the powers of the State governments they 
would have imitated the framers of the original Constitution, and have 
expressed that intention.”133 
Acting on that suggestion, Bingham said he imitated the limitations 
on the states in Article I, Section 10.  He used the “no state shall” 
language Marshall had suggested would indicate an intent to apply the 
Bill of Rights to the states.  Though some thought the privileges or 
immunities protected by the Fourteenth Amendment included all 
common law and other rights previously protected solely by the states, 
Bingham had a more limited conception. Bingham continued: “the 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as 
contradistinguished from citizens of a State, are chiefly defined in the 
first eight amendments to the Constitution of the United States.”  
Bingham then read, word for word, the first eight amendments.134  By 
the force of the Fourteenth Amendment, Bingham said, “no State, 
hereafter can . . . ever repeat the example of Georgia and send men to the 
penitentiary, as did that State, for teaching the Indian to read the lessons 
of the New Testament. . . .”135 
Bingham said the states had denied basic constitutional rights to 
United States citizens, and, prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, 
American citizens had no remedy.  “They denied trial by jury, and he 
had no remedy.  They took property without compensation, and he had 
no remedy.  They restricted the freedom of the press, and he had no 
 
 132. Id. at App. 83, col.2. 
 133. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 42(1) App. 84, col.1. 
 134. Id. at App. 84, col.2. 
 135. Id. at App. 84, col.3. 
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remedy.  They restricted freedom of speech, and he had no remedy.  
They restricted the rights of conscience, and he had no remedy.”136 
How did Bingham respond to the state action argument?  Bingham 
insisted that Congress had power to legislate for “the better enforcement 
of all powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United 
States, and for the better protection of the people in the rights thereby 
guarantied to them against States and combinations of individuals.”137  
According to Bingham, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments “vest in Congress power to protect the right of citizens 
against States, and individuals in States, never before granted.”138  He 
pointed out that the Constitution differed from the Articles of 
Confederation in that it gave Congress power to act directly on 
individuals.139 
What, he wondered, “would this Government be worth if it must 
rely upon states to execute its grants of power, its limitations of power 
upon States, and its express guarantees of rights to the people?”  States 
had concurrent power to protect citizens’ basic rights, but “must we wait 
for their action?  Are not laws preventive, as well as remedial. . .?  Why 
not in advance provide against the denial of rights by States, whether the 
denial be acts of omission or commission, as well as against the 
unlawful acts of combinations and conspiracies against the rights of the 
people?”140 
Bingham was making three interrelated  arguments.  First, he 
argued that the Fourteenth Amendment required states to obey the 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights.  Second, he argued that the basic rights 
in the Bill of Rights were now rights of American citizens that Congress 
could protect.  Third, it could now protect basic rights such as free 
speech, not only against state action but against private conspiracies 
such as those of the Ku Klux Klan. 
The Court soon ruled against him on all counts.141  In a series of 
decisions, the Court denied that the Fourteenth Amendment required 
states to obey the guarantees of the Bill of Rights and insisted that 
congressional enforcement power was limited to state action and did not 
 
 136. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 42(1) 85, col.2. 
 137. Id. at 82, col.3. 
 138. Id. at 83, col.1. 
 139. Id. at 85, col.1. 
 140. Id. at 85, col.2. 
 141. E.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 
(1876); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (refusing to apply the liberties in the Bill of 
Rights to the states); Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) 
(state action requirement). 
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reach private action.  As to application of the Bill of Rights, the 
Bingham position, though not his analysis, has now mostly won the day.  
But the Court continues to limit congressional power to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment to state action.142 
XI.  BINGHAM AS A CONSTITUTIONAL DRAFTSMAN 
Since Bingham’s plan to require states to obey guarantees of the 
Bill of Rights failed to be accepted by the Supreme Court for many 
years, one natural response is to find Bingham wanting.  The draftsman, 
not the Court, must be at fault. 
Several things are worth noting in Bingham’s defense.  First, the 
use of the words “privileges” and “immunities” made textual sense as a 
collective phrase to describe individual constitutional rights, including 
those in the Bill of Rights.  In the years from 1830 to 1866 it was quite 
common to describe basic rights in the Bill of Rights as privileges or 
immunities that belonged to all American citizens.143  A modern 
dictionary also suggests that the word privileges would include basic 
constitutional rights.144  Leading Republicans often used the words in 
that way.  A number also interpreted Article IV the way Bingham read 
it–as protecting privileges and immunities [constitutional rights] 
belonging to citizens of the United States in all the states.145 
Second, Bingham did use the “no state shall” formula that Barron 
had suggested would have indicated an intent to apply the Bill of Rights 
to the states.  In that respect, Bingham’s proposal was similar to James 
Madison’s unsuccessful amendment to the Constitution designed to 
protect free speech, free press and the rights of conscience against the 
states.  Madison’s proposed amendment passed the House, but failed in 
the Senate, so it never made it into the Bill of Rights.  Like Madison, 
Bingham crafted his prohibition in the words of Article I, section 10’s 
limits of the states.  Like Madison, he used the words “no state shall.”  
One can even cite Madison as using the word “privilege” as Bingham 
did.  In a 1789 speech in favor of his proposal to require the states to 
 
 142. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 620 (2000). 
 143. Curtis, Historical Linguistics, supra note 59, at 1110-32. 
 144. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 5 (1995) defines abridge as 
“reduce. . . lessen, diminish, or curtail. . . .” Id., and “privilege” as “a right, immunity, or benefit 
enjoyed by a particular person or a restricted group of persons” or “the rights common of all citizens 
under a modern constitutional government.” Id. at 1074. 
 145. E.g., GLOBE, supra note 32, at 36(1) App. 205, col. 2 (1860)(Owen Lovejoy) 38(1) 1202 
(1864) (James Wilson); GLOBE, supra note 32, at 39(2) 811, col. 1 (1867)(John A. Kasson). See 
generally, CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 15, at 34-56; Curtis, Historical 
Linguistics, supra note 59, at 110-24. 
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respect  the rights of free press and conscience, Madison described the 
rights as “invaluable privileges.”146 Bingham used the same word to 
describe constitutional rights listed in the Bill of Rights, including rights 
listed by Madison in his unsuccessful effort to place additional 
constitutional limits on the states. 
Third, as Bryan Wildenthal has shown, in the years after ratification 
of the Fourteenth Amendment and before the Court rejected application 
of the Bill of Rights to the states under the privilege or immunities 
clause, application was widely accepted by both Southern Democrats 
and Republicans. 147  Finally, the Court might have, but did not, examine 
the congressional debates with their strong evidence of intent to apply 
the guarantees.148 
Bingham might have followed “no state shall . . . abridge” with 
“rights in the Bill of Rights” instead of “privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States.”  From his perspective, the problem, was 
that the privileges or immunities were only “chiefly” set out in the Bill 
of Rights.  There were also others.  For a Court committed to the idea 
that there were no rights of American citizens in the Bill of Rights (just 
limits on federal power), a collective reference to the rights in the Bill of 
Rights might also have been treated as an empty set.  In retrospect, the 
safest course might have been to specify each and every right states were 
forbidden to abridge.  But that prolix provision is born from the wisdom 
of hindsight. 
Scholars looking at the incorporation issue have raised technical 
legal issues.  If the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the First, then, 
by one view, it really is a form of gibberish.  “No state shall abridge the 
guarantee that Congress shall make no law.”  Of course, what the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates by reference are the privileges and 
immunities of free speech, free press, freedom to assemble and petition, 
and free exercise of religion.  It does not incorporate the prohibition 
against the denial of these rights by Congress.  In the First Amendment, 
these privileges and immunities are, at the very least, secured against the 
 
 146. The amendment passed the House but was defeated by the Senate.  Free speech was added 
to Madison’s original proposal by the House.  Madison argued for his amendment (number 14 on 
his list) because the “State Governments are as liable to attack the invaluable privileges as the 
General Government is, and therefore ought to be as cautiously guarded against.” 2 THE BILL OF 
RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1032, 1113, 1122 (Bernard Schwartz, ed. 1971). 
 147. Brian Wildenthal, The Lost Compromise: Reassessing the Early Understanding in Court 
and Congress on Incorporation of the Bill of Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, 61 OHIO. ST. 
L.J. 1051 (2000). 
 148. This statement is intensely controversial and scholars continue to wrangle over the 
significance of the congressional debates. 
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action of Congress.  In the Fourteenth Amendment, a new security is 
thrown around these rights–the guarantee that “no state shall” abridge 
them. 
A second technical legal argument relates to the freedom of speech 
and press as understood in 1791, when the states ratified the First 
Amendment.  If the First Amendment meant merely to protect against 
prior restraint, the argument asserts, then the phrase incorporated by 
reference in the Fourteenth Amendment could mean no more.  “Water 
can rise no higher than its source.”  It is highly dubious that the 
Blackstone “no prior restraint” vision of freedom of the press was the 
vision of 1791.149 
But even if it were, it does not follow that the words should have 
the meaning attributed to them in 1791.  First, assume that the 
Fourteenth Amendment had explicitly provided that no state shall 
abridge freedom of speech or press.  Would we insist that the words 
must be given their 1791 meaning even though it is quite clear that was 
not how they were understood in 1868?  Not if we followed the idea that 
constitutional provisions reflect at the least the decisions of “we the 
people” at the time of their enactment.  Not if we looked at the 
“original” 1868 meaning of words for guidance.  By 1868, the idea that 
free press was merely a protection against prior restraint had virtually 
disappeared from general discussion. 
Instead of writing out a long list of all privileges and immunities 
explicit or implicit in all the constitutional guarantees, John Bingham 
used the device of incorporation by reference.  In theory, constitutional 
provisions come from “we the people” and judges often say they are to 
be interpreted to effectuate the popular will.  If we follow ideas of 
popular sovereignty, then the words would mean at least what they 
meant to people in 1868, not what they meant to some judges in 1798 or 
even to “the people” in 1791.  The other approach says, “well of course 
we know what you meant to say, but it doesn’t count because you failed 
to use exactly the right words.”  Meaning is a search for purpose and 
purpose should be understood contextually.  The “we know what you 
meant but you didn’t use just the right words so what you said does not 
work” approach exalts form over substance.  It constrains constitutional 
interpretation by a series of arbitrary rules unrelated to the purposes the 
amendment sought to advance. 
Those who proposed and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment 
 
 149. See, e.g., CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 19, at chapters 1, 2, and 3 and authorities 
cited. 
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understood freedom of speech and press to include freedom from prior 
restraint and freedom from subsequent punishment.  That is what should 
count.  (The evidence for that hypothesis is much stronger than the 
evidence for the contrary hypothesis.)  The attacks on free speech, free 
press, and freedom of religious expression the Republicans had been 
complaining about were subsequent punishments (and private violence), 
not prior restraints. 
Bingham’s claim of power to reach private conspiracies looks weak 
today, though it was aimed only at conspiracies designed to punish the 
exercise of constitutional rights.  In good part, that is so because 
Bingham’s theory contradicts long established Supreme Court doctrine 
forged after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Bingham 
believed that the rights in the Bill of Rights belonged to American 
citizens, an understanding he thought had been recognized by the 
references to the rights in the national Constitution.  He saw that Barron 
stood in the way of that vision because it held the Bill of Rights did not 
limit the states.  But with Barron eliminated and the Fourteenth 
Amendment ratified, Bingham thought the rights were established.  By 
this view the negative “no state shall . . . abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States” language implicitly 
recognized that Americans had such privileges and protected the 
underlying rights of American citizens set out in the Bill of Rights. 
As Bingham and many understood it, the Fourteenth Amendment  
proclaimed constitutional rights including those privileges and 
immunities in the Bill of Rights to be rights of citizens of the United 
States.  Since Congress had the power to enforce the amendment under 
Section five, it could legislate to protect citizens against private attacks 
designed to deny Americans their rights. 
Federalism concerns shared by Bingham and others would still 
have required some implicit limits on federal power.  Congress could 
only reach actions motivated by the specific intent to deprive citizens of 
constitutional rights.  The states would retain concurrent power to punish 
the violations, unless the state remedy contradicted the federal one. 
Implying a right from limitations on state power was hardly 
unprecedented.  Nor was the next step, concluding that the Constitution 
mandated or at least authorized protection of the right, even against 
private persons.  That seems to be the lesson from two Supreme Court 
cases,  Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Ableman v. Booth.  Both decisions 
read the Constitution very broadly to protect rights of slave owners.150 
 
 150. See CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 15, at 81, 106, 159-61, and 235 n. 49 
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In Prigg v. Pennsylvania,151 the Court held  that  slave owners had a 
constitutional right to seize “slaves” in free states and take them back to 
a slave state without any judicial process at all.152 The right was treated 
as implicit in the essentially negative language of the Fugitive Slave 
Clause.  “No [slave] held to service or labor in one State under the Laws 
thereof, escaping into another, shall in Consequence of any Law or 
Regulation therein, be discharged from such [slavery] but shall be 
delivered up on the Claim of the [slave owner].” In free states all people 
were presumed to be free. The Court’s decision implied, from the 
prohibition on state laws in the fugitive slave clause, a slaveholder’s 
right to recapture his “slave” without any judicial process.  For 
Americans of African descent, the Prigg decision had potentially heavy 
costs.  The slaveholder’s right of recapture found in Prigg stripped 
blacks in the North of protection implicit in the presumption of 
freedom.153   
The Court’s reading of the power provided by the Fugitive Slave 
Clause went further.  In Ableman v. Booth,154 the Court suggested that 
the fugitive slave law of 1850–a law that punished private persons for 
assisting escaping slaves–was constitutional in all respects.155  Both 
 
(discussing Prigg and state action problems). 
 151. 41 U.S. 539 (1842).  Prigg v. Pennsylvania held that  slave owners had a constitutional 
right to seize “slaves” in free states and take them back to a slave state without any judicial process 
at all.  Id. at 613. This was so even though in free states all people were presumed free; in slave 
states mere color gave rise to a presumption of slavery.  Id. at 576  In effect, the Court’s decision, 
stripped blacks of the presumption of freedom. 
As the Court saw it, any delay in the right of the alleged slave owner, including the delay 
required for a due process hearing, was intolerable. Id. at 612-613.  So slave owners could capture 
and remove “slaves” with no process at all.  But what if the black person being dragged away was 
not a slave?  Pennsylvania had argued that whether the person was a slave was the very issue that 
needed to be decided.  Id. at 576-77.  A rule allowing private parties to seize “slaves” without a 
judicial hearing to determine status threatened free blacks.  Id.  It was an unreasonable seizure in 
violation of the Fourth amendment.  Id.  A government-authorized removal without a hearing 
deprived the “person” who was seized of liberty without due process.  Id.  Pennsylvania also argued 
that the language of the Fugitive Slave Clause which required that true slaves be “delivered up” on 
the “claim” of the slaveholder presupposed a judicial determination of status.  Id. at 574-575.  
Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1858) said the fugitive slave law of 1850 which punished private 
interference with the right was constitutional in all respects. 
 152. Prigg, 41 U.S. at 613. 
 153. Id. at 576.  For a complimentary perspective, see, e.g., Rebecca Zeitlow, Belonging, 
Protection and Equality: The Neglected Citizenship Clause and the Meaning of Equality, 62 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 281, 326 (2000); Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 26, 70 (2000). 
 154. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1858). 
 155. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462, sec. 7 (1850).  “[T]he act of Congress 
commonly called the fugitive slave law is, in all of its provisions, fully authorized by the 
Constitution of the United States.”  Ableman, 62 U.S. at 526 (1858). 
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Prigg and Ableman established that Congress had the power to protect 
rights inferred from restrictive constitutional provisions.  Indeed, during 
the debate on the Civil Rights Bill of 1866, James Wilson, Chairman of 
the House Judiciary Committee, cited Prigg as authority for Congress’ 
power to pass the bill based on the due process clause.  If a 
constitutional right implied a remedy for slave owners, he said, certainly 
the law must do at least as much for the newly freed slaves.156  If the bar 
on state legislation in the Fugitive Slave Clause implied a right for slave 
owners—a right Congress could enforce against private persons—why 
should the Fourteenth Amendment not be read to imply rights such as 
free speech that Congress could protect against private persons? 
Again and again in 1866, Republicans had insisted that allegiance 
and protection are reciprocal.  To many it seemed clear that the nation 
must have the power to protect basic rights of  its citizens from whom it 
could demand the ultimate sacrifice.  In the years before the Civil War 
many opponents of slavery had been victims of mob violence, violence  
that was denounced again and again as a violation of the basic privilege 
of free speech secured to all citizens by the national Constitution.157  In 
1866, Republicans insisted on the need for protection of the rights of 
citizens.  Some cited the New Orleans and Memphis riots against blacks 
and Republicans to show the need for the amendment.158 
Many insisted on a new far more protective concept of American 
citizenship.  “If the cry ‘I am a Roman citizen’ protected the Roman in 
his mongrel republic,” asked Senator Nye in a speech in California after 
the thirty-ninth Congress had adjourned, “with what redoubled force 
does the cry that I am an American citizen protect me.”159  Congressman 
Woodbridge of Vermont made a similar claim.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment was designed “to cement the Union, [so] that any of us can 
go into any State in the Union with the declaration ‘I am an American 
citizen’ with the same consciousness of protection as of old it was 
sufficient for any citizen of the Roman empire to say ‘I am a Roman 
citizen’.”160  Congressman James Wilson defended the amendment as 
necessary to protect free speech.  Northern boys “must have the same 
liberty of speech in any part of the South as they always have had in the 
North. . . .  [N]o more cross road committees to wait upon liberty loving 
men. . .”–a reference to mob violence often inflicted on opponents of 
 
 156. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 39(1) 1294. 
 157. See, e.g., CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, supra note 19, at 229-39, 281-88. 
 158. CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 15, at 159. 
 159. Id. at 142. 
 160. Id. at 143. 
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slavery.161 
Still, much of the discussion in 1866 explicitly referred to the need 
to protect against state action and state inaction.162  The first version of 
the Bingham amendment, the one that gave Congress power to secure to 
all persons, equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property, 
had been criticized because it seemed to some to allow Congress to 
legislate directly on all subjects and to preempt all state laws.163 
Before the Court rejected congressional power to reach private 
attacks on Bill of Rights liberties, a federal circuit decision held rights in 
the Bill of Rights were rights that Congress could protect against private 
conspiracies.  Since the Bill of Rights limited both the federal 
government and the states under the Fourteenth Amendment, the rights 
were secured to the citizen and could be protected by the federal 
government against private attacks.  Though issued by a circuit judge, 
much of the decision had in fact been written by Supreme Court Justice 
Joseph P. Bradley.  So it represented the view of not just one judge, but 
of two.164 
In the case of the Fourteenth Amendment, Bingham finally 
persuaded the Congress to accept his proposal.  Bingham was less 
successful in his effort to change the proposed language of what became 
the Fifteenth Amendment. 
XII.  JOHN BINGHAM AND THE RIGHT TO VOTE 
In January of 1869, Congress was considering a constitutional 
amendment dealing with the right to vote.  The amendment, as finally 
ratified, provided that the right of United States citizens to vote shall not 
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of 
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.  John Bingham advocated 
a different approach.  Basically, his proposal prohibited states from 
abridging or denying the franchise to male citizens of the United States 
who were over twenty-one years of age and of sound mind.  Bingham 
 
 161. Id. at 145. 
 162. See, e.g., id. at 53-54, 62. 
 163. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 39(1) 1063-65 (Rep. Hale); 1082 (Sen. Stewart); 1083, 1087 
(Rep. Davis).  GLOBE, supra note 32, at 42(1) at App. 151 (Garfield) (1871); Hale, a Republican, 
had opposed the prototype of the Fourteenth Amendment; but in 1875, he insisted that the final 
version of the amendment was not limited to state action and could reach private conduct.  GLOBE, 
supra note 32, at 43(2) 479-480 (1875). Garfield voted for the final bill which did reach certain 
private action.  See GLOBE, supra note 32, at 42(1) 808. 
 164. United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79, 81-82 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1871 (No. 15,282).  The 
Court’s reasoning was suggested by Justice Bradley in response to a letter of inquiry by Judge 
Woods.  CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE, supra note 15, at 172. 
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left the states with only a few additional powers to regulate suffrage.  
They were allowed to establish a residency requirement of not more than 
one year, and states could disfranchise those who had been convicted of 
treason or other infamous crimes as well as those who engaged in 
rebellion in the future.165  Bingham objected to allowing 
disfranchisement of all who had served in the Confederate army. 
Recognizing that the much broader protection might not succeed, 
on February 20, 1869, Bingham later sought to add additional limitations 
to the proposal to forbid discrimination based on race, color, or previous 
condition of servitude.  As a fall back position, Bingham proposed that 
“the right to vote and hold office shall not be denied or abridged by 
States on account of race, color, nativity, property, creed, or previous 
condition of servitude.”  Still he indicated that he preferred something 
like his earlier broader protection.166 Bingham did not succeed with 
either proposal. 
Bingham’s preferred version of the amendment would have 
protected the right to vote more broadly than the Fifteenth Amendment 
as it was enacted.  It would have done so because it would have 
prevented any restrictions beyond those allowed.  The poll tax, literacy 
tests, tests of the ability to read and understand the state constitution and 
similar methods used in the 1890s in early 1900s to disfranchise blacks 
and some poor whites would have been more obviously unconstitutional. 
Whether any constitutional provision would have protected the 
right to vote against a faction determined to eject their opponents from 
power “peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must”167 is doubtful—unless 
of course the people of the nation regained and maintained the will to 
protect the right to vote. 
XIII.  CONCLUSION 
I began this essay with a reflection on our national story, the stories 
we tell, the stories we ignore, and the stories we have repressed.  For 
nations as well as individuals, recognizing and accepting the darker side 
of our experience is important for transformation. 
American history reveals a gap between ideals and practice.  We 
have had slavery, the denial of the vote to those men without sufficient 
property, gender discrimination and the denial of the vote to women, 
 
 165. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 40(3) 638, 728 (1869). 
 166. Id. at 1426, 1427, col.1. 
 167. VERNON L. WHARTON, THE NEGRO IN MISSISSIPPI 1865-1890, 187 and generally chapter 
13 (1947, 1965). 
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political terrorism, mistreatment of workers, and a racial caste system.  
The large darker side of our national experience is illuminated by the 
efforts of John Bingham. 
Stephen A. Douglas and Chief Justice Roger Taney both confronted 
the tension between the Declaration of Independence and slavery.  Both 
Taney and Douglas interpreted the words of the Declaration in light of 
the slaveholding practice of some of the signers and Founders and in 
light of the clauses of the Constitution that recognized slavery.168 They 
insisted that the Declaration’s signers were not hypocrites.  Since 
Jefferson and other signers held and continued to hold slaves, when they 
wrote all people are created equal they could not have meant the 
declaration to be read literally.  According to Taney and Douglas, what 
they actually meant was that all white men are created equal.169 
In contrast to Douglas and Taney, another common approach to the 
gap between ideals and practice is simply to reject the framers as 
hypocrites.  The same approach can be applied to more recent framers—
such as those of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Like all human beings, 
many also failed to live up fully to their ideals—for example on issues 
like womens’ rights and integration.  They also have “failed to keep up 
with the times as a result of being dead.” 
Another approach is to recognize the radical idealism of the 
American Revolution, the Declaration, and of the later Fourteenth 
Amendment, and to acknowledge that its authors naturally fell short of 
fully realizing their ideals.  Lincoln read the Declaration as setting out 
the basic purposes of the nation, as a charter of freedom.  But he 
admitted that its authors had not instituted the equality they espoused for 
blacks.  Indeed, he pointed out that they had not even established it for 
all white men.  The Declaration was a statement of national ideals. Like 
all statements of ideals, it represented a goal to be pursued.  It was a 
statement of ethical aspirations rather than a description of current 
 
 168. CREATED EQUAL: THE COMPLETE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES OF 1858, 62-63 (Paul M. 
Angle, ed. 1958) (Douglas on the Declaration).  Taney in Dred Scott makes the same claim:  
The general words above quoted [“all men are created equal”] would seem to embrace 
the whole human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this day would 
be so understood. But it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race were not 
intended to be included, and formed no part of the people who framed and adopted this 
declaration; for if the language, as understood in that day, would embrace them, the 
conduct of the distinguished men who framed the Declaration of Independence would 
have been utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they asserted; and 
instead of the sympathy of mankind, to which they so confidently appealed, they would 
have deserved and received universal rebuke and reprobation.   
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 410. 
 169. Id. 
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practice.  Here is Lincoln’s numinous explication: 
I think the authors of that notable instrument [the Declaration of 
Independence] intended to include all men, but they did not intend to 
declare all men equal in all respects.  They did not mean to say all 
were equal in color, size, intellect, moral developments, or social 
capacity.  They defined with tolerable exactness, in what respects they 
did consider all men created equal—equal in “certain inalienable 
rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”  
This they said, and this they meant.  They did not mean to assert the 
obvious untruth, that all were then actually enjoying that equality, nor 
yet, that they were about to confer it immediately upon them.  In fact 
they had no power to confer such a boon.  They meant simply to 
declare the right, so that the enforcement of it might follow as fast as 
circumstances should permit.  They meant to set up a standard maxim 
for free society, which should be familiar to all, and revered by all; 
constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even though never 
perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby constantly 
spreading and deepening its influence, and augmenting the happiness 
and value of life to all people of all colors every where.  The assertion 
“that all men are created equal” was of no practical use in effecting our 
separation from Great Britain; and it was placed in the Declaration, not 
for that, but for future use.  Its authors meant it to be, thank God, it is 
now proving itself, a stumbling block to those who in after times might 
seek to turn a free people back into the hateful paths of despotism.  
They knew the proneness of prosperity to breed tyrants, and they 
meant when such should re-appear in this fair land and commence their 
vocation they should find for them at least one hard nut to crack.170 
John Bingham made similar contributions.  Bingham was a student 
of the history of liberty and of the United States Constitution. As a 
result, he could and did situate his efforts in the larger story of Anglo-
American liberty.  Because he was a student of the Constitution, 
Bingham recognized, as many of his colleagues initially did not, why a 
constitutional amendment was needed to secure for American citizens 
Bill of Rights liberties against the states.  He also saw how the 
amendment would greatly reinforce the claim of constitutional power to 
pass the Civil Rights Bill, a recognition that distinguished him from 
many of his colleagues.  Bingham cherished the vision of the 
Constitution that secured basic rights equally to all citizens regardless of 
wealth, race, sex, nationality, or religion.  Though at first, in common 
 
 170. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES, LETTERS, MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS, THE LINCOLN 
DOUGLAS DEBATES (1832-1858) 398-99 (Library of America ed. 1989). 
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with others at that time, he did not see the right to vote as fundamental, 
his later statements show that he, like the nation, was moving in that 
direction.  Still, as Bingham understood it, the basic protections of the 
due process clause extended to all—citizens and foreigners; to people of 
all colors, black, yellow, or white; and to women as well as men.  He 
failed to understand the full implications of his constitutional ideals of 
equal protection for gender discrimination—but so did many others at 
the time.171 
In the apparently endless debates about the purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, scholars argue about whether the amendment 
was intended as a limited guarantee of equality under state law or as a 
protection of national rights of American citizens set out in the 
Constitution.  (Of course, the arguments are not mutually exclusive.)  
For Bingham the ideas of equality and basic national rights of American 
citizens throughout the republic were mutually reinforcing.  As he saw 
it, the Due Process Clause, which extended its protections to all persons, 
both protected basic rights and, because it did so for all, it secured 
equality.  Similarly, provisions granting basic rights to all citizens, 
secured substantial equality. 
Bingham read the Constitution and the Bill of Rights as statements 
of legal ideals.  He recognized many of the shortcomings of 
contemporary practice.  And Bingham, as much as anyone, worked to 
bring those ideals closer to reality.  Though sometimes subjected to 
judicial abuse, the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection and due 
process clauses have been important protections for the liberties of 
American citizens. The Court has recently breathed new life into the 
privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,172 though 
it remains to be seen whether it will eventually read it as Bingham, many 
of his colleagues, and many of their contemporaries did–to protect basic 
constitutional rights of all citizens. 
The abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison rejected the Constitution 
as an agreement with hell and a covenant with death and publicly burned 
it.173 But Bingham saw its ideals and its promises.  He also saw clearly 
how the ideals had been compromised as a result of slavery.  But 
because he appreciated and cherished the ideals, Bingham was well 
positioned for the work of extending them. 
In one way, it is easy to understand why the story of John Bingham 
 
 171. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 39(1) at 1063, 1089 (discussing the rights of married women). 
 172. Sanez v. Roe, 536 U.S. 489 (1999). 
 173. E.g., HENRY MAYER, ALL ON FIRE: WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON AND THE ABOLITION OF 
SLAVERY 313, 445 (1998). 
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was ignored for so long.  Again and again and again, Bingham’s story 
intersects with what had been omitted parts of our national narrative and 
illuminates the dark recesses of the national shadow—suppressions of 
free speech and civil liberty in the interests of slavery; rejection of the 
ideals of the Declaration by people who became leaders of the 
Confederacy and the new South; denials of basic rights to African 
Americans by the Southern state governments Andrew Johnson installed 
right after the Civil War; use of political terrorism against blacks and 
Republicans during Reconstruction; the Supreme Court’s rejection of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s basic protection of constitutional rights of all 
Americans in every state; the destruction of Reconstruction statutes, and 
denials of the right to vote to blacks; and the perversions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees to protect corporate empires from 
democratic regulation. 
I know very little about how John Bingham felt when he saw the 
wreck the United States Supreme Court was making of his handiwork.  
How did he react when the Court rejected application of the liberties in 
the Bill of Rights to the states and treated the privileges or immunities 
clause as mostly meaningless?  These decisions were reached, at least in 
part, in the interest of preserving the rights of the states.  What did he 
think when the Court pulled the teeth out of Reconstruction statutes 
designed to enforce constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities of 
American citizens against state or private attack? These had been written 
to protect the rights, privileges, and immunities of citizens of the United 
States.  When the Court found that there were very few of these and that 
they did not include any rights in the Bill of Rights,174 the statutes lost 
much of their effect.  What did he think about the conversion of the 
Fourteenth Amendment from a protection for all constitutional rights for 
all citizens to a bulwark of corporate power against the protests of 
farmers and workers?  Here we have a bit more information.  Bingham 
later wrote that the amendment had been designed to protect natural 
persons, not corporations.175  That seems quite reasonable, particularly 
since the first sentence of Section one refers to persons “born or 
naturalized in the United States.” 
In one way, the neglect of Bingham’s story is understandable. It 
does not fit well with the story often told, or with the story of the 
 
 174. E.g., United States v. Cruikshank; 92 U.S. 542 (1876).  The Court’s subsequent revival of 
the incorporation doctrine also revived some of these remaining statutes.  See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 
365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
 175. Erving Beauregard, “John A. Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment,” 40 THE 
HISTORIAN 67, 69 (1987).  Unfortunately the correspondence cited appears to have been lost.  Id. 
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Supreme Court as the consistent guardian of our liberties. 
In another way, the neglect is quite hard to understand.  After all, 
Bingham’s story is a central part of the story of American liberty: the 
struggle against slavery and its legacy; the struggle for equality; and for 
free speech and press and other basic constitutional rights. 
We continue to struggle to understand the meaning of our American 
experience.  The current controversy over how to understand the Lost 
Cause and the Lost (Privileges or Immunities) Clause176 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment shows the presence of the past.  Not too long 
ago, Gale Norton, now President Bush’s Secretary of the Interior, spoke 
about the meaning of the Civil War and events that followed it.  She 
noted that with the defeat of the Confederacy “we lost too much.  We 
lost the idea that states were to stand against the federal government 
gaining too much power over our lives.”  John Ashcroft, now Attorney 
General, expressed similar sentiments.  He said “traditionalists must do 
more” to defend the Southern heritage.  “I’ve got to do more.”177 
Recently, in United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court 
reiterated the state action requirement and expressed its approval of 
decisions that destroyed the effort, based on the Fourteenth Amendment, 
to enforce Reconstruction statutes against private suppression of the 
exercise of rights protected by the Bill of Rights.  Like its predecessors 
during and after Reconstruction, the Court in 2000 was motivated in 
good part by a legitimate concern for federalism.  And in fairness to the 
Court, the historical record on the state action subject is puzzling and 
contradictory.  The Court’s approach to the state action problem has 
some support in text and history, though it over looked evidence 
supporting a contrary interpretation.  Many in 1866, including John 
Bingham,178 described the amendment as prohibiting denial of basic 
rights by states.  But the Court reaffirmed its prior decisions in sweeping 
terms.  In United States v. Morrison, the Court repeated once again 
[T]he time-honored principle that the Fourteenth Amendment, by its 
very terms, prohibits only state action. “[T]he principle has become 
firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by 
the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as 
may fairly be said to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no 
 
 176. The reference to the “lost clause” comes from Akhil Amar.  Akhil Reed Amar, Lost 
Clause, NEW REPUBLIC, June 14, 1999, at 15. 
 177. Quoted in James M. McPherson, Southern Comfort, NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS, April 
12, 2001 at 28. 
 178. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 39(1) 1088-89, 2542 (Bingham on the amendment as giving 
Congress power to prohibit unconstitutional state actions). 
51
Curtis: The Story of American Liberty
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2003
NEWCURTIS.DOC 7/28/03  11:48 AM 
668 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:617 
shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or 
wrongful.”179 
The Court said that Congress had exceeded its Section five power 
in the Reconstruction statutes because such laws were “‘directed 
exclusively against the action of private persons, without reference to the 
laws of the State, or their administration by her officers.”180  Morrison’s 
reasoning may suggest that, indeed, Congress had no power to protect 
Republicans in the South from private attacks designed to punish them 
for their decision to associate with the Republican party and espouse its 
doctrines.  It further suggests that such a sweeping dictum was essential 
to preserve the role of the states.  The actual issue, however, was much 
narrower.  Did the Fourteenth Amendment allow Congress to pass 
statutes such as the anti-KKK acts?  These laws were limited to 
punishing private action taken for the purpose of denying basic liberties, 
including those in the Bill of Rights.  The laws also reached private 
action denying equal protection of the laws.  The conspiracies were 
designed to punish American citizens because of their political 
expression, beliefs, and affiliation.  The Court could have upheld such 
laws while still rejecting an essentially unlimited power under Section 
five to preempt any and all state laws. 
Some prior Court decisions make Morrison somewhat less 
troublesome.  The Court had broadly interpreted the Thirteenth 
Amendment and has held it has no state action requirement.181  As a 
result, the federal government could today protect blacks from private 
race-based attacks.  Under Morrison and prior cases, a claim to federal 
protection for Socialists, Republicans, Catholics, Unitarians, or 
Democrats subjected to private attack because of their beliefs would 
have little chance of success. 
The vision of Republicans passing legislation to combat the Ku 
Klux Klan was broader.  In 1871 discussing a bill to enforce the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Senator Edmunds explained that the bill  did 
not reach things like a private conspiracy growing out a neighborhood 
feud.  “[B]ut if . . . it should appear that this conspiracy was formed 
against this man because he was a Democrat, . . . , or because he was a 
Catholic, or because he was a Methodist, or because he was a 
Vermonter . . . this section could reach it.”182  Much of the violence 
 
 179. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621. 
 180. Id. at 621. 
 181. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); Compare, Griffin v. 
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983). 
 182. GLOBE, supra note 32, at 42(1) 567, col. 2-3 (1871). 
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against blacks was based on their decision to support first the 
Republican and later the Populist party. 
In Morrison, the Court also paid homage to the judges who had 
excised Bill of Rights liberties from the Fourteenth Amendment and 
destroyed much of the congressional effort to protect white and black 
Republicans in the South. 
The force of the doctrine of stare decisis behind these [state action] 
decisions stems not only from the length of time they have been on the 
books, but also from the insight attributable to the Members of the 
Court at that time. Every Member had been appointed by President 
Lincoln, Grant, Hayes, Garfield, or Arthur—and each of their judicial 
appointees obviously had intimate knowledge and familiarity with the 
events surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.183 
John Bingham also appreciated the virtues of a federal system and 
the role of the states.  But, understandably, he was more fully aware of 
the abuses of civil liberty states and mobs had practiced in the years 
before the Civil War.  So there is considerable tension between the 
Bingham story and the Court’s  traditional understanding of Fourteenth 
Amendment history.  There is even more tension between Bingham’s 
story and the “Southern heritage” story of a Civil War over states’ rights. 
Constitutional declarations of rights depend to an important extent 
on popular adherence to the ideals they declare. That is at least one 
reason why forgetting the story of John Bingham and his colleagues has 
been such a loss.  A more complete account of our national story would 
help us better to understand our national values and the struggles to 
preserve them.  The values of the judges who interpret them also matter. 
Bingham’s story and his setbacks remind us that the struggle for 
liberty is never finally won.  But there is a second moral to Bingham’s 
story, to the story of the Second Reconstruction’s realization of many of 
the ideals of the first, and to the story of how most guarantees of the Bill 
of Rights were eventually applied to the states as Bingham planned.  
Though the battle for liberty is never finally won, the battle is also never 
finally lost. 
 
 183. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621. 
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